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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Katherine Mims Crocker*
A range of scholars has subjected qualified immunity to a wave of criticism—
and for good reasons. But the Supreme Court continues to apply the doctrine
in ever more aggressive ways. By advancing two claims, this Article seeks to
make some sense of this conflict and to suggest some thoughts toward a resolution.
First, while the Court has offered and scholars have rejected several rationales for the doctrine, layering in an account grounded in structural constitutional concerns provides a historically richer and analytically thicker
understanding of the current qualified-immunity regime. For suits against
federal officials, qualified immunity acts as a “compensating adjustment” to
the separation-of-powers error ostensibly underlying the Court’s decision to
allow such suits without congressional approval. For suits against state officials, qualified immunity addresses federalism concerns by leveling the field
for constitutional enforcement so that state defendants do not face harsher
penalties than their federal counterparts do.
Second, while this structural account situates the doctrine within powerful
constitutional currents, it does not justify the current qualified-immunity regime. For suits against federal officials, the structural account articulates a
poor compensating adjustment because qualified immunity supplies an
awkward solution to any separation-of-powers problem. For suits against
state officials, the structural account appears to rest on a notion of “freestanding federalism” that is too far removed from the actual constitutional
design.
Alongside prior scholarship, and for different reasons for suits against federal
and state officials, this analysis leaves the present model of qualified immunity ripe for rejection or replacement with a more rights-protective alternative.

* Olin-Smith Fellow and Postdoctoral Associate, Duke University School of Law;
counsel, McGuireWoods LLP. The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily
reflect any views of my employers. For thoughtful comments and guidance, thank you to Will
Baude, Stuart Benjamin, Sam Bray, Guy Charles, Michael Collins, Larry Crocker, John Duffy,
Dick Fallon, Tara Grove, Ben Grunwald, Kristin Hickman, John Jeffries, Cagle Juhan, Lyle
Kossis, Randy Kozel, Maggie Lemos, Marin Levy, Julia Mahoney, Darrell Miller, Bill Mims,
Jeremy Mullem, Tom Nachbar, Caleb Nelson, Jim Pfander, Jeff Pojanowski, Jack Preis, Bob
Pushaw, Richard Re, George Rutherglen, Steve Sachs, Fred Smith, James Stern, Aaron Tang,
Kevin Walsh, Ernie Young, and participants in various workshops.

1405

Michigan Law Review

1406

[Vol. 117:1405

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1406
I.
HASHING OVER THE HARLOW STANDARD .................................. 1412
A. Doctrinal Overview ................................................................ 1412
B. Academic Evaluations............................................................ 1415
II.
BRINGING IN THE BIVENS BACKGROUND .................................... 1421
A. Previous Understandings ....................................................... 1422
B. The Separation-of-Powers Line of Logic .............................. 1424
1. Bivens’s Rise and Retrenchment ................................... 1424
2. Justice Powell’s Relevance ............................................. 1429
C. One Wrinkle ............................................................................ 1431
EXPLORING THE § 1983 EXTENSION ............................................ 1432
III.
A. Previous Understandings ....................................................... 1432
B. The Federalism Line of Logic................................................. 1435
1. The Reasoning Behind Economou ................................ 1435
2. Ensuing Entreaties Toward Equivalence ..................... 1437
C. Two Qualifications ................................................................. 1439
IV.
ASSESSING THE STRUCTURAL ACCOUNT..................................... 1440
A. The Separation-of-Powers Line of Logic .............................. 1440
1. If Bivens Is Not Broken ..................................................... 1440
2. Silver Bullet or Square Peg................................................ 1442
B. The Federalism Line of Logic................................................. 1448
1. Equal Sovereignty ........................................................... 1449
2. The Fourteenth Amendment ........................................ 1452
3. Freestanding Federalism ................................................ 1455
C. Three Upshots ......................................................................... 1457
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 1460
INTRODUCTION
Qualified immunity, which provides a defense for executive-branch officials in damages lawsuits alleging the violation of constitutional rights, has
enjoyed a prominent spot on the Supreme Court’s docket for over thirty
years. In 1982, the Court articulated the current form of qualified immunity
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 1 holding that “government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages”

1.

457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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in constitutional-tort suits “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established . . . rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” 2
Since then, the Court has repeatedly expanded the protections afforded by
the doctrine in new and more muscular ways. Over the same period, however, scholars have done a great deal to undermine the reasons that the justices
have offered for adopting the current qualified-immunity regime, and much
of the legal community more broadly has come out against it.
Why has the Court “doubl[ed] down” on a doctrine that has been the
subject of so much criticism? 3 By focusing on the justices’ stated rationales,
critics have largely overlooked an account of qualified immunity rooted in
constitutional structure and, specifically, in certain separation-of-powers
and federalism concerns. This structural account is important because it offers a historically richer and analytically thicker view of the doctrine’s development. But on close examination, the considerations underlying this
account provide no compelling justification for the defense, leaving the present model of qualified immunity ripe for replacement or, indeed, rejection.
But why does qualified immunity matter? Among other reasons, because
it excuses conduct that seems inexcusable. Consider Kisela v. Hughes, 4 one of
the Supreme Court’s latest qualified-immunity decisions. A police officer
shot a woman four times while she was standing outside her home about six
feet from her roommate. 5 To be sure, the woman was holding a kitchen knife
at her side, and the police had received a report that a woman had been using a kitchen knife to hack a tree. 6 But the woman was calm when the police
confronted her, and the officer who gunned her down gave her no warning. 7
The Court granted qualified immunity. 8 In dissent, Justice Sotomayor said
that the majority’s opinion “tells officers that they can shoot first and think
later” and “tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished.” 9 One could say the same thing about White v. Pauly, 10 a 2017 Supreme Court decision vacating the denial of qualified immunity where a
police officer shot and killed a man inside his home without sufficient warning 11—or about Mullenix v. Luna, 12 a 2015 Supreme Court decision reversing the denial of qualified immunity where an officer fatally shot the driver

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 87 (2018).
138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018).
Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1151.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1151–52.
Id. at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
137 S. Ct. 548 (2017).
White, 137 S. Ct. at 549–51.
136 S. Ct. 305 (2015).
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of a fleeing vehicle from a highway overpass in defiance of direct orders and
then asked, “[h]ow’s that for proactive?” 13
These examples are all drawn from the Supreme Court’s recent docket,
but the facts of some lower-court cases are even more egregious. In one case,
police officers—again without warning—lowered a dog over a wall and into
the backyard of a mobile home while pursuing a robbery suspect. 14 The dog
bit the mobile-home resident, who was eighty-nine years old. 15 The wound
became infected; the man’s leg had to be amputated; and he died the next
month. 16 The court granted qualified immunity. 17 In another case, police officers tied a man that they had arrested on a traffic warrant to a metal pole in
a deserted parking lot in the middle of the night and drove away, leaving him
alone for about ten minutes until officers from another department picked
him up. 18 The defendants claimed that they had been playing a prank. 19 The
court excoriated them for “Keystone Kop activity that degrades those subject
to detention and that lacks any conceivable law enforcement purpose.” 20 But
it nevertheless granted qualified immunity. 21
Qualified immunity shields many kinds of government officials, not just
police officers. In one Supreme Court case, for instance, several middleschool employees benefited from the doctrine after strip-searching a thirteen-year-old girl suspected of providing prescription-strength ibuprofen
and a nonprescription painkiller to classmates. 22 Indeed, there is “no reliable
way to know how often zoning officials, welfare bureaucrats, or prison
guards act on unconstitutional grounds or discard mandatory procedures.” 23
Nevertheless, constitutional violations have become “routinized in some
urban neighborhoods.” 24 And qualified immunity has become a prominent
part of the national conversation surrounding law-enforcement conduct and
racial injustice in the wake of recent events, especially police shootings of

13. Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 306–08; id. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Luna v.
Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 717 (5th Cir. 2014)). Indeed, Sotomayor argued that the majority
“sanction[ed] a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach” here as well. Id. at 316.
14. McKay v. City of Hayward, 949 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2013). This case is
discussed in Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 67–70 (2017).
15. McKay, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 975.
16. Id. at 975–76.
17. Id. at 984–85.
18. Robles v. Prince George’s County, 302 F.3d 262, 271 (4th Cir. 2002). This case is discussed in John F. Preis, Qualified Immunity and Fault, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1969, 1974–76
(2018).
19. Robles, 302 F.3d at 266.
20. Id. at 271.
21. Id.
22. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377–79 (2009).
23. Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65
DUKE L.J. 1, 3–4 (2015).
24. Id. at 3.
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unarmed black men. 25 Many believe that “[t]he acquittal” recently “of another Baltimore police officer charged in the death of Freddie Gray, like the acquittal 25 years ago of the Los Angeles officers who beat Rodney King,
reveals the inadequacy of the criminal-law remedy” in an acute way. 26 And
scholars and advocacy organizations ranging from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund to the Cato Institute have urged a reevaluation
of doctrines like qualified immunity that allow law-enforcement officers who
misuse their power to evade civil accountability. 27
Qualified immunity, of course, matters not only to plaintiffs and others
concerned with protecting constitutional rights, but also to defendants and
others concerned with curbing spurious suits against public servants. To
quote Harlow, and as explored in more detail below, “claims frequently run
against the innocent as well as the guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant
officials, but to society as a whole.” 28 Qualified immunity, the thinking goes,
helps ease such burdens where they are relatively unlikely to be cost justified.
So why does an account of qualified immunity rooted in constitutional
structure matter? Consider the state of the debate. As expounded below,
much of the legal community disapproves of qualified immunity, 29 but the
Supreme Court continues to enhance its scope and strength. 30 Scholars at-

25. See Eugene Scott, Supreme Court Justice Affirms Activists’ Fears That Police Can
‘Shoot First and Think Later,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/03/supreme-court-justice-affirms-activists-fears-that-policecan-shoot-first-and-think-later/ [https://perma.cc/Y522-SZT6].
26. Jon O. Newman, Opinion, Here’s a Better Way to Punish the Police: Sue Them for
Money, WASH. POST (June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/heres-abetter-way-to-punish-the-police-sue-them-for-money/2016/06/23/c0608ad4-3959-11e6-9ccdd6005beac8b3_story.html [https://perma.cc/VS4X-HNR5].
27. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Is Responsible for the Stealth Assault on Civil
Rights?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 893, 911 (2016) (reviewing SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT:
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT (2015)); LDF Statement on
the Non-Indictment of Cleveland Police Officers in the Shooting Death of Tamir Rice, LDF (Dec.
28, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/ldf-statement-on-the-non-indictment-ofcleveland-police-officers-in-the-shooting-death-of-tamir-rice [https://perma.cc/8STA-EN3A];
Qualified Immunity: The Supreme Court’s Unlawful Assault on Civil Rights and Police Accountability, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/events/qualified-immunity-supreme-courtsunlawful-assault-civil-rights-police-accountability [https://perma.cc/AYC7-7KQ5].
28. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see infra Section I.A.
29. See Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualified to Abolish Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2000 (2018) (“The critics and critiques of qualified immunity . . .
are by now legion . . . . [T]he chorus of dissent from the doctrine is growing louder of late.”);
see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J.
87, 89 (1999) (“In today’s constitutional landscape, the largest, most lamented, and least defended gap between right and remedy involves money damages.”); infra Section I.B.
30. See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 64 (2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s qualified immunity opinions . . . have made a sub silentio assault on constitutional tort suits. In a number of recent rulings, the Court has engaged in a pattern of covertly broadening the defense . . . .”); Schwartz,
supra note 14, at 6 (stating that the Court “appears to be on a mission to curb civil rights law-
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tack the defense on multiple grounds. Several argue that it is unjust, unclear,
unfair to disfavored populations, or dependent on assumptions that defy reality. And recent commentary contends that it lacks the historical support
necessary to qualify as a background legal principle, represents a poor analogy to the rule of lenity, and fails to rectify the effects of a purported error in
precedent that some say provides it cover.
Many prior attacks on qualified immunity focus on rationales that
members of the Supreme Court themselves have given. And many of these
attacks are compelling. But the judges and commentators who continue to
support the doctrine have evidently found them unconvincing or incomplete. Additional accounts of where qualified immunity comes from and why
it persists, therefore, may offer both sides of the debate a more comprehensive understanding of the problem. One such account turns on constitutional structure and comprises two lines of logic. The first relates to suits against
federal officials, and the second relates to suits against state officials. Ultimately, neither legitimates qualified immunity, but each fails for different
reasons.
The starting point is that Harlow arose under the Supreme Court’s 1971
decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 31 which established an implied cause of action against federal officials for violating federal constitutional rights. 32 When Harlow was decided,
the Bivens regime was facing increasing hostility for separation-of-powers
reasons, with several justices arguing that the judiciary should not allow
damages suits without congressional approval. The historical context thus
suggests that Harlow offered an indirect opportunity to restrain the Bivens
regime by strengthening qualified immunity, and a range of evidence suggests that the Court did just that. Consequently, separation-of-powers concerns appear to provide qualified immunity an important source of support
in the Bivens context.
The Court next addressed whether the Harlow standard should apply
beyond Bivens actions to suits arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides an express cause of action against state officials for violating federal
constitutional or statutory rights. 33 The Court answered in the affirmative,
explaining that applying different standards to federal and state defendants

suits against law enforcement officers, and appears to believe qualified immunity is the means
of achieving its goal”); see also infra Section I.A.
31. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
32. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). Section 1983 provides a cause of action against both
state and local-government officials. For the sake of simplicity, however, I usually refer to the
former only.
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would have been untenable. The reasoning behind this move suggests that
federalism concerns provide qualified immunity an important source of
support in the § 1983 context.
This structural account situates the doctrine’s development within powerful currents of constitutional jurisprudence. But it does not justify the current qualified-immunity regime. The separation-of-powers strand regards
qualified immunity as a judge-made solution to a judge-made problem—that
is, as a “compensating adjustment” to the judicial overreach ostensibly underlying Bivens actions. But those who support the Bivens paradigm would
probably reject the premise that a problem exists in the first place. And those
who oppose it should be troubled by qualified immunity for the same reason
that they are troubled by implied constitutional causes of action: both inquiries allow the judiciary to make arguably legislative determinations about
which constitutional-tort suits should proceed. The separation-of-powers
aspect of the structural account advanced here thus fails to provide qualified
immunity a persuasive justification.
More difficult to see is the theoretical basis underlying the federalism
strand of the structural account—other than an intuitive belief that the law
should treat state and federal officials the same way. As a thought experiment, though, at least three rationales seem possible: one arising from an
equal-sovereignty principle, one from the incorporation doctrine associated
with Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one from the congruence-and-proportionality concept associated with Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. These theories do not withstand scrutiny as requiring
equivalent qualified-immunity standards for state and federal officials. Section 1983 does not seem to infringe state sovereignty in any way that would
offend an equal-sovereignty principle. And among other shortcomings, any
imperative stemming from Section 1 or 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
should apply to all § 1983 suits concerning the Bill of Rights, but qualified
immunity applies only to damages claims against executive officials for discretionary actions. Accordingly, although federal–state parallelism in constitutional enforcement warrants additional attention, no particular legal
principle appears to offer sufficient support for applying the Harlow standard to § 1983 suits on the federalism grounds identified in this analysis. Instead, this aspect of the structural account advanced here appears to rest on a
notion of “freestanding federalism” that is too far removed from the actual
constitutional design.
Of note, the term “qualified immunity” here generally refers to the Harlow standard except where the context indicates otherwise, notwithstanding
the fact that the moniker predates the model. The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of Harlow and other key doctrinal developments and then surveys previous academic evaluations of qualified
immunity. Part II explores the import of the Bivens backdrop to the Harlow
standard’s emergence and excavates the separation-of-powers line of logic
from Supreme Court opinions. Part III recounts the Harlow standard’s expansion from the Bivens environment into the § 1983 sphere and uncovers
the federalism line of logic. Part IV offers a normative assessment of the
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structural account of qualified immunity advanced here, ultimately contending that a sufficient justification for the doctrine remains elusive. This analysis thus bolsters the calls of critics across the legal community to reject
qualified immunity—or at least to replace it with a more sensible, and more
rights-protective, alternative.
I.

HASHING OVER THE HARLOW STANDARD

This Part provides a primer on the Supreme Court’s constitutional-tort
immunity jurisprudence, including the decisions that paved the way for Harlow and those that have subsequently expanded the protections afforded by
qualified immunity. The Part proceeds to consider academic evaluations of
the Harlow standard, including several that undermine the reasons offered
by the justices for constructing such a government-protective system.
A. Doctrinal Overview
Qualified immunity is widely viewed as “the most important doctrine in
the law of constitutional torts.” 34 The Harlow standard provides that “government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” 35 Explaining that the doctrine represents “an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” the Supreme
Court has made clear that the protection “is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” 36
The story behind Harlow begins in important ways with Pierson v. Ray, 37
a 1967 Supreme Court decision stemming from the arrest of several Freedom
Riders for gathering at a Mississippi bus terminal. Pierson said that § 1983
“should be read against the background of tort liability.” 38 And in the context of “police officers making an arrest,” the Court said, the background of
tort liability included “the defense of good faith and probable cause.” 39
Pierson thus adopted a tort-specific concept of a historical common-law de34. John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851,
852 (2010).
35. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
36. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512 (1985). With respect to damages suits, absolute immunity generally shields officials from claims based on legislative, judicial, and some
prosecutorial functions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (prosecutorial functions); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (judicial functions); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (legislative functions). It also protects the president with respect to
official acts. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982). And sovereign immunity generally safeguards state and federal entities, as well as individuals sued in their official capacities.
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1985).
37. 386 U.S. 547.
38. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 362 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)).
39. Id. at 557.
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fense. But seven years later in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 40 which arose from the 1970
shooting of students at Kent State University by the Ohio National Guard,
the Court extended the good-faith defense beyond the arrest context to suits
involving state-level executive action at large. 41 Then, in Butz v. Economou, 42
a 1978 case involving claims against defendants affiliated with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Court further extended the defense to suits
against federal officials under Bivens. 43
Harlow followed in 1982. The flagship section of Justice Powell’s majority opinion begins by declaring that “[t]he resolution of immunity questions
inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative.” 44 On the one hand, the Court said, “an action for damages may
offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.” 45
But on the other, “claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the
guilty—at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a
whole.” 46 These “social costs,” the Court remarked, “include the expenses of
litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the
deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.” 47 Another cost,
the Court said, “is the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.’ ” 48
The Court proceeded to consider whether to make “an adjustment of the
‘good faith’ standard” established by prior decisions. 49 It had become clear,
the Court said, that “substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective
good faith of government officials.” 50 In addition to “the general costs of
subjecting officials to the risks of trial,” the Court cited “special costs to ‘subjective’ inquiries of this kind,” like “broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official’s professional colleagues.” 51
These inquiries, the Court said, “can be peculiarly disruptive of effective
government.” 52
The Court thus concluded that “bare allegations of malice should not
suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
1949)).
49.
50.
51.
52.

416 U.S. 232 (1974).
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 237.
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Economou, 438 U.S. at 507.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982).
Id. at 814.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
Id. at 814–15.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 816–17.
Id. at 817.
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burdens of broad-reaching discovery.” 53 Instead, the Court held that “government officials performing discretionary functions” generally should not
face damages liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” 54 This “objective” inquiry, the Court made clear, did not require subjective good faith on the part of defendants. 55
The Harlow standard has remained the analytical reference point for applying qualified immunity. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly expanded
the doctrine’s protections in new and more muscular ways.
One could catalogue multiple substantive examples. For instance, the
Court has subtly lowered the bar for benefiting from the defense by shifting
the standard for denying qualified immunity from whether “a” reasonable
person would have known of the right in question to whether “every” reasonable person would have known of the right in question. 56 And the Court
has repeatedly stated that the doctrine shields “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 57 What is more, the Court has
required lower courts to ask whether rights were clearly established at a very
low level of generality, 58 such that “the clearly-established-law standard of
Harlow is fact-specific and qualified immunity is correspondingly broad.” 59
And the Court has strictly limited the sources of law that can render a right
clearly established, making qualified immunity increasingly easy to obtain. 60
The Court has also accorded qualified immunity a privileged position in
the law’s procedural scaffolding. It has held, for instance, that federal-court
defendants may immediately appeal denials of qualified immunity when the
defense fails on the ground that the right in question was clearly established. 61 And the Court has taken up and overturned lower-court decisions
concerning qualified immunity with a frequency and consistency of out-

53. Id. at 817–18.
54. Id. at 818.
55. See id. at 818–19.
56. Kinports, supra note 30, at 65.
57. This statement appears in Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018), and District
of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018), but those are just two of the most recent examples. It first appeared in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
58. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987) (“[I]f the test of ‘clearly established law’ were to be applied at [a high] level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ that is the touchstone of Harlow. Plaintiffs would be
able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.”).
59. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’
Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 82 (1999).
60. See Kinports, supra note 30, at 69–72.
61. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985). By contrast, defendants may
not immediately appeal denials of qualified immunity that are based on the conclusion that
“the evidence in the pretrial record was sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial.”
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995).
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come—in favor of the defendant government officials—seen in few other areas of law. 62 Over the last decade, moreover, the Court has often done so
through the relatively rare and especially assertive mechanism of summary
reversal, which without merits briefing or oral argument condemns lowercourt rulings as incorrect. 63
At bottom, the Supreme Court “is not just maintaining the doctrine of
qualified immunity as a matter of precedent.” 64 Instead, the justices are
“doubling down” on the doctrine by “enforcing it aggressively against lower
courts.” 65
B. Academic Evaluations
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s fondness for qualified immunity,
Harlow and its offspring have experienced an increasingly hostile reception
in the academy. Indeed, the rules surrounding qualified immunity have
“been roundly criticized as incoherent, illogical, and overly protective of
government officials who act unconstitutionally and in bad faith.” 66
One idea is that qualified immunity contravenes the moral ideal of “corrective justice,” which has been called “the most persuasive nondeterrence
justification for awarding tort damages to victims of government unconstitutionality.” 67 Typified by Erwin Chemerinsky’s commentary, this criticism
asserts that the doctrine is insufficiently protective of basic freedoms. 68 Under this view, qualified immunity inappropriately allows officials who violate
constitutional rights to duck judicial consequences and diminishes individual dignity, governmental accountability, and societal faith in systems of power. 69
Other evaluations disparage the doctrine as difficult to decipher. 70 As
one judge puts it: “Wading through the doctrine of qualified immunity is
62. See Baude, supra note 3, at 82 (“In the thirty-five years since it announced the objective-reasonableness standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court has applied it in thirty qualified
immunity cases. Only twice has the Court actually found official conduct to violate clearly established law. Those two findings, in Groh v. Ramirez and Hope v. Pelzer, occurred more than a
decade ago.” (footnote omitted)).
63. See id. at 85–88.
64. Id. at 87.
65. Id.
66. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 11.
67. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on
the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 93–96 (1989).
68. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, How the Supreme Court Protects Bad Cops, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/how-the-supremecourt-protects-bad-cops.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
69. See id. For a somewhat related argument that qualified immunity “does not properly
assess fault because it immunizes persons who are at fault and holds liable persons who are
not,” see Preis, supra note 18, at 1971–72.
70. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 34, at 852 (“[D]etermining whether an officer violated
‘clearly established’ law has proved to be a mare’s nest of complexity and confusion.”); Chaim
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one of the most morally and conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate
court judges routinely face.” 71
Taking a different tack, some scholars have approached qualified immunity from what one could characterize as a functionalist perspective. Exemplified by Richard Fallon and Daryl Levinson, these theorists argue that
simplistic criticisms of the right–remedy gap ignore the realities of actual adjudication. 72 “[R]ights and remedies are inextricably intertwined,” they contend, in that “[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just for their
application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence.” 73
Aziz Huq’s functionalist critique argues that the Supreme Court devised
fault rules like the Harlow standard “as a result of the judiciary’s institutional
interests in prestige and docket management.” 74 Because these rules incline
courts away from addressing the kind of routine and fact-intensive conduct
that makes up many constitutional wrongs, Huq contends that “the Court
has rendered most difficult to remedy” those injuries that represent “the
lowest visible forms of unconstitutional violence” and that affect “many of
the least politically powerful communities” in the nation. 75
Other lines of inquiry examine the arguments that members of the Supreme Court themselves have advanced for qualified immunity. One line critiques rationales rooted in policy, and another critiques rationales rooted in
positive law.
Joanna Schwartz has led the charge against the Court’s policy rationales
with two empirical studies. The first revolves around the “frequently repeated” contention that qualified immunity “protects government officials” as
individuals “from the burdens of financial liability.” 76 Schwartz’s research
challenges this assumption by suggesting that “[p]olice officers are virtually
always indemnified” by state and local governments and “are also almost always provided with defense counsel free of charge.” 77 This holds true,
Schwartz says, even when indemnification is “prohibited by statute or policy” and when defendants are “disciplined or terminated by the department
or criminally prosecuted for their conduct.” 78 She therefore concludes that
Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1155–56 (2005) (“Despite the almost annual ritual of doctrinal clarification, the federal reporters are crammed with dissents
and en banc decisions taking issue over the proper scope and role of qualified immunity.”).
71. Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the
Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000).
72. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479 (2011); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 (1999).
73. Levinson, supra note 72, at 858.
74. Huq, supra note 23, at 9–10.
75. Id. at 70–74.
76. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 59.
77. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890, 915 (2014).
78. Id. at 890.
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“qualified immunity can no longer be justified as a means of protecting officers from the financial burdens of personal liability.” 79
Schwartz’s second study challenges another hypothesis underlying the
Supreme Court’s embrace of the Harlow standard. As Schwartz explains, the
Court “has described ‘the “driving force” behind’ ” qualified-immunity doctrine as “resolving ‘ “insubstantial claims” against government officials . . . prior to discovery.’ ” 80 But according to her analysis of § 1983 suits
against law-enforcement officers in certain jurisdictions, just 0.6% of cases
were dismissed because of qualified immunity before discovery, and just
3.2%, before trial. 81 She therefore concludes that “qualified immunity doctrine infrequently plays its intended role in the litigation of constitutional
claims against law enforcement.” 82
While Schwartz has focused on the Court’s policy rationales, William
Baude has focused on positive law by examining three “technical legal justification[s]” that the Court has offered for qualified immunity. 83 The first and
“most widely known theory,” Baude writes, argues that “the immunity is a
common-law backdrop that could be read into” § 1983 under familiar tenets
of statutory interpretation. 84 Echoing others, 85 Baude argues that several historical problems plague this theory. 86 For one, there was no “general immunity” at common law. 87 Accordingly, “there was no well-established, goodfaith defense in suits about constitutional violations when Section 1983 was
enacted, nor in Section 1983 suits early after its enactment.” 88 And recent
immunity jurisprudence has “distorted” any common-law connection in
multiple ways. 89 Harlow, for instance, consciously broke from the good-faith
framework of Pierson and its progeny. 90 And more broadly, the doctrine has
become “increasingly protective” of defendants. 91
A second justification is what Baude calls the “lenity theory” of qualified
immunity. 92 Around the time that it enacted § 1983, Congress passed a crim-

79. Id. at 939.
80. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 60 (alteration in original) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 76.
83. Baude, supra note 3, at 46.
84. Id. at 52; see, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383–84 (2012).
85. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental
Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14–21 (1972).
86. Baude, supra note 3, at 55–61.
87. Id. at 55. Instead, a defense premised on the defendant’s good faith arose as “part of
the elements of” certain torts. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 60–61.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 61; see supra Section I.A.
92. Baude, supra note 3, at 69–77.
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inal statute, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242, that penalized government officials for violating federal constitutional or statutory rights. To provide “fair
warning” and avoid vagueness problems, the Supreme Court has long applied a narrowing construction to § 242 by requiring “a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of
law.” 93 The Court has on occasion explicitly analogized qualified immunity
to this lenity-related rule, 94 and certain aspects of the doctrine may implicitly
do the same. 95 Baude, however, identifies multiple problems with this theory
too. First, lenity is usually restricted to criminal-law contexts. 96 Second,
§ 1983 offers no textual hook for a lenient approach (unlike § 242, which
punishes only rights violations committed “willfully”). 97 And third, qualified
immunity “has come to bear little practical resemblance to the rules applicable to criminal defendants.” 98 In particular, although the Court “has explicitly rejected the relevance of circuit splits to the lenity inquiry,” 99 judicial
discord all but answers the qualified-immunity question in the affirmative. 100
Baude locates a third justification for the Harlow standard in a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia. In Crawford-El v. Britton, 101 Scalia admitted
that “our treatment of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has not
purported to be faithful to the common-law immunities that existed when
§ 1983 was enacted, and that the statute presumably intended to subsume.” 102 But “[t]hat is perhaps just as well,” Scalia said, because the Court
had erroneously expanded liability under § 1983 beyond what the text could
bear. 103 As Scalia put it, in Monroe v. Pape, 104 the Court had
93. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103–05 (1945) (plurality opinion).
94. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259
(1997); see also Baude, supra note 3, at 71–72.
95. For example, the refrain that qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” which the Court first
stated in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986), calls to mind “criminal recklessness or deliberate wrongdoing,” Baude, supra note 3, at 72. For an extended analysis likening qualified
immunity to fair notice in the criminal-law context, see Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1998).
96. According to Baude, the Court generally invokes lenity in civil-law settings only
where the same statutory language applies in a criminal-law setting as well. See Baude, supra
note 3, at 72–73 (first citing United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517–
18 (1992) (plurality opinion); then citing id. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring); then citing Crandon
v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); and then citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12
(2004)).
97. Id. at 73 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012)).
98. Id. at 74.
99. Id. at 74–75 (emphasis omitted) (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108
(1990), and United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984)).
100. See id. at 75.
101. 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
102. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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converted an 1871 statute covering constitutional violations committed
“under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any
State,” into a statute covering constitutional violations committed without
the authority of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any
State, and indeed even constitutional violations committed in stark violation of state civil or criminal law. 105

Baude finds issues with this reasoning as well. First, he says, Monroe was
probably right. Among other things, he argues that “under color of [law]” is
a historical term of art that includes “false claims of legal authority” and that
aspects of § 1983’s drafting history suggest that the statute carries this meaning. 106 Second, even if one grants Scalia’s premise, Baude says, “the results
ought to be nothing like the modern regime of qualified immunity.” 107 Instead, they ought to be like the system envisioned by Justice Frankfurter in
his Monroe dissent, such that federal liability attaches only when the state
fails to remedy the wrong. 108 But qualified immunity under Harlow “comes
closer to tracking state common law than . . . to filling in state law’s gaps.” 109
Taken together, the arguments outlined above significantly undermine
the case for qualified immunity, especially with respect to the justices’ own
accounts of their reasoning. But these arguments have not gained universal
acceptance in the academic community. A recent essay by Aaron Nielson
and Christopher Walker, for instance, attempts to poke holes in Baude’s and
Schwartz’s work. 110 As Nielson and Walker point out, the conclusion of
Schwartz’s second study (concerning the rejection of § 1983 suits early in the
litigation process) seems especially susceptible to skepticism because of some
debatable design decisions. 111 The study, for example, counts a case “as dismissed on qualified immunity grounds only if the entire case has been dismissed as a result of the motion.” 112 So it does not include cases where the
court granted leave to amend the complaint, where some but not all individual defendants moved for qualified immunity, where an individual defendant moved for qualified immunity on some but not all claims, or where there
was a municipal defendant. 113
105. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2012)).
106. Baude, supra note 3, at 63–65 (citing Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of “Under Color
of” Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 325, 344 (1992), and David Achtenberg, A “Milder Measure of
Villainy”: The Unknown History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of “Under Color of” Law,
1999 UTAH L. REV. 1, 4 n.13, 5 n.18, 22 n.151, 59–60).
107. Id. at 66.
108. Id. at 66–69; see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202–59 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
109. Baude, supra note 3, at 68.
110. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853 (2018).
111. See id. at 1879.
112. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 42.
113. Id. at 42–43.
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Nevertheless, arguments defending the current qualified-immunity regime often include considerable caveats. Nielson and Walker offer only a
“qualified defense” of qualified immunity, recognizing that the doctrine “is
by no means perfect.” 114 And although Nielson and Walker’s primary concern is largely procedural, 115 other academic advocates of qualified immunity
acknowledge more substantive shortcomings.
John Jeffries provides a prominent example. Jeffries endorses incorporating fault-based conditions into constitutional adjudication through qualified immunity and related doctrines. 116 He contends that “the curtailment of
damages liability for constitutional violations has deep structural advantages
for American constitutionalism” in two ways. 117 First, it “fosters the development of constitutional law” through “facilitat[ing] constitutional change
by reducing the costs of innovation.” 118 The argument here is that judges
would hesitate to expand constitutional rights if doing so regularly entailed
imposing damages on government defendants. 119 Second, making damages
less available “biases constitutional remedies in favor of the future.” 120 The
argument here is that limiting retrospective monetary relief allows courts to
focus on preventing future harms by awarding injunctive and declaratory
remedies. 121
Notwithstanding his general support for qualified immunity, Jeffries
admits that there are serious flaws in multiple aspects of the doctrine. These
include “the level of generality” at which to assess whether a right is “clearly
established”; “the question of which courts count in” making that assessment; and “a dysfunctional interaction between the law of qualified immunity, as currently stated, and the content of certain constitutional rights.” 122 In

114. Nielson & Walker, supra note 110, at 1854.
115. Nielson and Walker’s criticism of qualified immunity revolves around Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), which overruled Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), in allowing courts to exercise discretion to hold that an asserted constitutional violation did not contravene clearly established law without addressing whether a constitutional violation actually
occurred under the facts as alleged or adduced. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Empirical analysis,
they argue, shows that Pearson may produce “geographic distortions in the development of
constitutional law” and may push such development toward the ideological views of the judges
most likely to decide unnecessary constitutional questions. Nielson & Walker, supra note 110,
at 1884 (quoting Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2015)).
116. See Jeffries, supra note 29, at 90.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 98–105.
120. Id. at 90.
121. Id. at 105–10. Jeffries acknowledges, however, that if courts frequently exercise the
discretion afforded by Pearson, see supra note 115, “development of the law would be forestalled by repeated applications of qualified immunity.” John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order
of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120.
122. Jeffries, supra note 34, at 854–66.
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short, Jeffries concludes, qualified immunity offers an “extravagant” level of
protection to government officials. 123
A classic article by Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer expresses a similar
half measure of support for qualified immunity. The article argues that as
long as there exists “a general structure of constitutional remedies adequate
to keep government within the bounds of law,” the availability of liability
turning on novel legal developments ought to be analyzed under a framework that “sometimes tolerates situations in which individual victims receive
no effective redress.” 124 The Harlow regime, the argument continues, fits
comfortably within such a framework. 125 Nevertheless, the article calls official-immunity principles “troublesome” and says that they “restrict the availability of effective individual redress for constitutional violations far more”
than Fallon and Meltzer would have liked. 126
Whatever one’s position, the point is that an important conflict underlies the conversation surrounding qualified immunity. On the one hand, the
doctrine not only survives, but also thrives under the Supreme Court’s continuing cultivation. On the other, a significant segment of the legal community stands opposed, and scholars have done much to undermine the
justices’ stated reasons for embracing the doctrine. Indeed, the Court knows
about Baude’s recent work, but most of its members apparently remain
committed to the same course as before. 127 There is thus reason to believe
that qualified immunity rests on something more than the justices’ own accounts disclose—and that uncovering and confronting other bases for the
doctrine may prove useful in seeking steps forward.
II.

BRINGING IN THE BIVENS BACKGROUND

Critiques of qualified immunity tend to overlook or underrate something important. Consider Baude’s article. The central concern relates to the
123. Jeffries, supra note 29, at 91.
124. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (1991).
125. Id. at 1821 (“Although individual redress is sacrificed under the Harlow immunity
standard, other remedies, such as injunctions and the exclusion of evidence obtained through
police misconduct, remain available to maintain a judicial check against government lawlessness.”).
126. Id. at 1738.
127. Justice Sotomayor cited Baude’s article on qualified immunity in her Kisela dissent.
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). And Justice Thomas
cited it in a separate opinion in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), where he surprised observers by indicating an
openness to doing away with qualified immunity, see, e.g., Perry Grossman, Clarence Thomas
to the Rescue?, SLATE (June 21, 2017, 1:24 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/06/in_ziglar_v_abbasi_clarence_thomas_signals_his_s
upport_for_civil_rights.html [https://perma.cc/MQH6-SJC7]. Noting that the parties had not
asked the Court to reconsider the doctrine in Abbasi, Thomas urged his colleagues to do so
“[i]n an appropriate case.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1872 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Harlow standard’s validity vis-à-vis a proper interpretation of § 1983. As a
formal matter, however, Harlow had nothing to do with § 1983. The plaintiff
sued two senior aides to President Nixon for eliminating his position with
the Air Force in retaliation for congressional testimony protected by the First
Amendment, so the constitutional claim arose under Bivens. 128 Indeed, observers often regard the Bivens aspect of Harlow’s heritage as mere historical
happenstance. 129 But as this Part argues, Supreme Court opinions suggest
that the Bivens context supplied Harlow both a methodological margin and a
structural rationale, with the latter resting on deeply held separation-ofpowers concerns.
A. Previous Understandings
Judges and others have sometimes noted that the origin of qualified
immunity in a Bivens case might bear on its operation or legitimacy in the
§ 1983 context. The inquiry, however, has usually stopped short of exploring
the issue in an extended way. In one dissent, for example, Justice Scalia remarked that Harlow and another qualified-immunity decision were “technically distinguishable” from the case at bar “in that they involved not the statstatutory cause of action against state officials created by Congress in § 1983,
but the cause of action against federal officials inferred from the Constitution by this Court in Bivens.” 130 But, Scalia said, Harlow and the other decision “made nothing of that distinction, citing § 1983 cases in support of their
holdings.” 131 He therefore dropped the issue.
Indeed, the literature exhibits a widespread assumption that Harlow responded to perceived problems with constitutional-tort litigation in general
rather than with the Bivens regime in particular. Under this view, qualified
immunity took root in a Bivens action instead of a § 1983 suit largely by
“happenstance and accident.” 132 The most nuanced version of this view permits the possibility that the Bivens context, as an area grounded in federal
common law, supplied the methodological freedom necessary for Harlow to
loosen the chains of statutory interpretation that had shackled qualified immunity to historical defenses in the § 1983 context. 133 Proponents of this

128. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802–05 (1982); see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731, 733–39 (1982).
129. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 3, at 50 n.14 (stating that “one might imagine that [the
Bivens cause of action] would have produced distinct questions of unwritten immunity” but
that “so far, the [Supreme] Court has mechanically equated the two sets of immunities”).
130. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 n.1 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Ilan Wurman, Qualified Immunity and Statutory Interpretation, 37 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 939, 961 (2014).
133. See id. at 955 (“[T]he Court seems to have dramatically altered qualified immunity
doctrine in the context of Bivens actions when it had less need (if any at all) to shape the doctrine as a matter of statutory interpretation. The doctrine may have been trending in this direc-
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possibility sometimes suggest that it was therefore improper for the Supreme
Court to expand the new standard into the § 1983 domain. 134
The methodological-freedom point seems right, especially given the
Court’s concurrent invocations of historical traditions when recognizing
immunities in the § 1983 context. 135 Moreover, in a case decided shortly after
Harlow, Justice Marshall (with whom Justice Blackmun joined and Justice
Brennan agreed) suggested that the Court enjoyed greater flexibility to expand immunities in Bivens actions than in § 1983 suits. 136
But was there more to the relationship between Bivens and Harlow?
James Pfander posits that the connection ran deeper than a mere facilitative
function in a particular respect. He argues that the “pressure for a uniform
federal standard that led in part to the recognition of Bivens liability” following the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 137 “also
produced a federal immunity rule” because “[v]ictims and government officials alike can make a strong claim for a consistent federal standard.” 138 But
Pfander points out that “the need for a uniform standard does not necessarily entail federal judicial control of the content of the standard or the adoption of the Harlow rule.” 139
As for judicial control and content, at least a couple of scholars have
suggested that official-immunity doctrines could be viewed as court-

tion, but it was in the context of Bivens that matters of policy took the reins completely and the
Court abandoned any common law underpinnings to immunity doctrine.”).
134. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 68 (1989); Gary S. Gildin, Immunizing Intentional
Violations of Constitutional Rights Through Judicial Legislation: The Extension of Harlow v.
Fitzgerald to Section 1983 Actions, 38 EMORY L.J. 369, 383–84 (1989) [hereinafter Gildin, Immunizing Intentional Violations]; Gary S. Gildin, The Standard of Culpability in Section 1983
and Bivens Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the Constitution, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 557, 587 (1983); Laura Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights
Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 935, 984 (1989); Stephen J. Shapiro, Public
Officials’ Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and Its Progeny: A Critical Analysis, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 267–68 (1989).
135. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529–42 (1984) (judicial immunity), superseded in part by statute, Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–317, 110
Stat. 3847 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417–29
(1976) (prosecutorial immunity).
136. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 364 n.33 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In my
view, we should be even more reluctant to import absolute immunities into § 1983 suits than
into Bivens actions. First, with § 1983 we deal with explicit statutory language indicating the
broad scope of the action, whereas Bivens actions have been implied by the federal courts. Second, the need to restrain state action implicit in the 14th Amendment is implicated by § 1983
suits, while that Amendment has no relevance to suits against federal officials.”); id. at 346
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing agreement with the relevant portion of Marshall’s dissent).
137. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
138. James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the Role of Judge-Made Law in Constitutional
Litigation, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1387, 1415–16 (2010).
139. Id. at 1416.
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sponsored efforts to curtail the availability of constitutional-tort causes of
action. Baude says that someone could “imagine a separate and distinct twowrongs-make-a-right argument for qualified immunity in the Bivens context,” 140 like the argument that Scalia advanced in the Monroe v. Pape context. 141 And Richard Fallon says that “one might well think of official imimmunity as limiting the scope of causes of action for damages.” 142 These
suggestions are both hypothetical and parenthetical. But as the analysis below argues, Supreme Court jurisprudence traces the outlines of just such an
account, rooted in separation-of-powers concerns.
B. The Separation-of-Powers Line of Logic
By situating Harlow within the pertinent jurisprudential context, it becomes evident that the Bivens backdrop likely loomed larger than previous
commentators have credited. The Bivens regime emerged during a time
when the Supreme Court regularly recognized implied causes of action in
the statutory sphere. As it moved away from this practice for separation-ofpowers reasons, the Court increasingly looked askance at Bivens actions too.
Harlow provided an oblique opportunity to act on this escalating skepticism.
1.

Bivens’s Rise and Retrenchment

The Supreme Court decided Bivens, which involved a warrantless arrest
of the plaintiff and search of his home, in 1971. The Court acknowledged
that neither the Constitution nor any congressional enactment expressly
provided for damages liability against federal officials for constitutional violations. 143 Nevertheless, the Court stated that “where federally protected
rights have been invaded, . . . courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so
as to grant the necessary relief.” 144 Ultimately, the Court held that the plaintiff was “entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered
as a result of the [defendants’] violation of the [Fourth] Amendment.” 145
Within the next decade, the Court recognized implied constitutional
causes of action in two additional cases. The first was Davis v. Passman, 146 a
1979 decision allowing an individual to sue a former congressman under the

140. Baude, supra note 3, at 63 n.99.
141. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)); see also supra text accompanying notes 101–105.
Because the Supreme Court has “mechanically equated the two sets of immunities” under
§ 1983 and Bivens, however, Baude declines to “consider them separately.” Baude, supra note 3,
at 50 n.14.
142. Fallon, supra note 72, at 487.
143. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396–97 (1971).
144. Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
145. Id. at 397.
146. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for terminating her employment because of her sex. 147 The second was Carlson v. Green, 148 a 1980 decision permitting the family of a deceased prisoner to sue the director of the
federal Bureau of Prisons under the Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment for failing to provide proper medical care. 149
Bivens came from a divided Court. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion
for a five-justice majority, and Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment. 150
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Blackmun each wrote a dissent,
all arguing that the Court offended separation-of-powers principles by recognizing a cause of action without congressional authorization. 151 Davis and
Green, both also penned by Brennan, 152 demonstrated continuing division.
In Davis, Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist all dissented. 153
In Green, only Burger and Rehnquist dissented, 154 but Powell, joined by
Stewart, authored an acerbic concurrence in the judgment. 155 With one unimportant exception, 156 all of the separate opinions in Davis and Green echoed the Bivens dissents by referencing separation-of-powers concerns. 157

147. Davis, 442 U.S. at 244–45.
148. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
149. Green, 446 U.S. at 20.
150. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389, 398.
151. Id. at 411–12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I dissent from today’s holding which judicially creates a damage remedy not provided for by the Constitution and not enacted by Congress. We would more surely preserve the important values of the doctrine of separation of
powers—and perhaps get a better result—by recommending a solution to the Congress as the
branch of government in which the Constitution has vested the legislative power.”); id. at 428
(Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he point of this case and the fatal weakness in the Court’s judgment
is that neither Congress nor the State of New York has enacted legislation creating such a right
of action. For us to do so is, in my judgment, an exercise of power that the Constitution does
not give us.”); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I had thought that for the truly aggrieved
person other quite adequate remedies have always been available. If not, it is the Congress and
not this Court that should act.”).
152. Green, 446 U.S. at 15; Davis, 442 U.S. at 229.
153. Davis, 442 U.S. at 249–55.
154. Green, 446 U.S. at 30–54.
155. Id. at 25–30.
156. In Davis, Stewart dissented on the ground that the Court should have vacated the
judgment and remanded the case for the court of appeals to address an immunity under the
Speech or Debate Clause. Davis, 442 U.S. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Rehnquist joined
Stewart’s opinion but also joined the other two dissents. Id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id.
at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I dissent because, for me, the case presents very
grave questions of separation of powers . . . . Congress could, of course, make Bivens-type remedies available to its staff employees—and to other congressional employees—but it has not
done so.”); id. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s discussion of the federal
judiciary’s purported “obligation to entertain private suits that Congress has not authorized”
and arguing that “[i]n the present case, . . . principles of comity and separation of powers
should require a federal court to stay its hand”); Green, 446 U.S. at 29 (Powell, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“In my view, the Court’s willingness to infer federal causes of action that can-
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The Supreme Court has since taken a dim view of this line of precedent.
As Ziglar v. Abbasi 158 put it in 2017, to understand Bivens, Davis, and Green,
it is necessary to understand the prevailing law when they were decided. In
the mid-20th century, the Court followed a different approach to recognizing implied causes of action than it follows now. During this “ancien regime,” the Court assumed it to be a proper judicial function to “provide
such remedies as are necessary to make effective” a statute’s purpose. Thus,
as a routine matter with respect to statutes, the Court would imply causes
of action not explicit in the statutory text itself. 159

According to the Abbasi Court, Bivens essentially imported this framework
from the statutory context into the constitutional context, but afterward,
“the arguments for recognizing implied causes of action for damages began
to lose their force.” 160
Indeed, by 1975, the Court had started to sour on the implication practice in the statutory arena, 161 and in 1979, the Court declared that “the judicial task was . . . ‘limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to
create the private right of action asserted.’ ” 162 Judges, the Court ultimately
said, must “interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it
displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy.” 163 Without such an intent, the Court concluded, “a cause of action does
not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might
be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.” 164
In view of this evolution, the Court has refused to recognize implied
constitutional claims beyond the specific circumstances of Bivens, Davis, and
Green. By repudiating Bivens’s rationale, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
in Abbasi left little hope for change. The Court stated that “it is a significant
step under separation-of-powers principles for a court to determine that it
not be found in the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doctrine of separation of powers
and hardly comports with a rational system of justice.”); id. at 30 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(stating that he had thought that Bivens, where he expressed separation-of-powers concerns,
was “wrongly decided”); id. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In my view, it is ‘an exercise of
power that the Constitution does not give us’ for this Court to infer a private civil damages
remedy from the Eighth Amendment or any other constitutional provision. The creation of
such remedies is a task that is more appropriately viewed as falling within the legislative sphere
of authority.” (citation omitted) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 428 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting))). In Davis, the justices’ concerns about interbranch conflict also revolved around the fact that the basis for the plaintiff’s
suit was a congressman’s personnel decision. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 249–51 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 251–55 (Powell, J., dissenting).
158. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
159. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1855 (citations omitted) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 287 (2001), and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)).
160. Id.
161. See id. at 1855–56 (collecting cases beginning with Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
162. Id. at 1856 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)).
163. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
164. Id. at 286–87.
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has the authority, under the judicial power, to create and enforce a cause of
action for damages against federal officials in order to remedy a constitutional violation.” 165 Hence, Abbasi reaffirmed that “expanding the Bivens
remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” 166 Abbasi even declared it
“possible that the analysis in the Court’s three Bivens cases might have been
different if they were decided today.” 167
Several scholars have suggested that Abbasi “all but overrules Bivens.” 168
But others believe that the eulogy for Bivens is premature. 169 Abbasi itself
said that “it must be understood that this opinion is not intended to cast
doubt on the continued force, or even the necessity, of Bivens in the searchand-seizure context in which it arose.” 170 Moreover, the Court continued,
“[t]he settled law of Bivens in this common and recurrent sphere of law enforcement, and the undoubted reliance upon it as a fixed principle in the law,
are powerful reasons to retain it in that sphere.” 171 So Bivens seems secure for
the moment, at least in its original Fourth Amendment space. 172

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856.
Id. at 1857 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).
Id. at 1856.
Michael Dorf, SCOTUS Severely Narrows Civil Rights Suits Against Federal Officers,
DORF ON LAW (June 19, 2017, 12:44 PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/06/scotus-severelynarrows-civil-rights.html [https://perma.cc/KZV9-WLFL]; see, e.g., Shirin Sinnar, The Ziglar v.
Abbasi Decision: Unsurprising and Devastating, SLS BLOGS: LEGAL AGGREGATE (June 20,
2017),
https://law.stanford.edu/2017/06/20/the-ziglar-v-abbasi-decision-unsurprising-anddevastating/ [http://perma.cc/H87E-M3K2]; Steve Vladeck, On Justice Kennedy’s Flawed and
Depressing Narrowing of Constitutional Damages Remedies, JUST SECURITY (June 19, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/42334/justice-kennedys-flawed-depressing-narrowingconstitutional-damages-remedies/ [https://perma.cc/2TLW-LK9S].
169. E.g., Richard M. Re, The Nine Lives of Bivens, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 22, 2017, 8:30
AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/06/the-nine-lives-of-bivens.html
[https://perma.cc/JDT6-BPJU].
170. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856.
171. Id. at 1857.
172. Abbasi was decided by a six-member bench because of recusals by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan and because the oral argument occurred before Justice Gorsuch joined the
Court. See id. at 1851. The majority therefore consisted only of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Id. The slim line-up seems unimportant, however, for there
is little reason to think that either Gorsuch or Justice Kavanaugh, who has since replaced Kennedy, would disagree with the majority’s cabining of the Bivens regime. See Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 429–30 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“The
[Supreme] Court has emphasized that it is ordinarily Congress’s role, not the Judiciary’s, to
create and define the scope of federal tort remedies. As the Court has explained, Bivens carved
out only a narrow exception to that bedrock separation of powers principle.”); id. at 431 (“If I
were a Member of Congress, I might vote to enact a new tort cause of action to cover a case like
[the one at bar]. But as judges, we do not get to make that decision.”); Harsh Voruganti, Judge
Neil Gorsuch – Nominee to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court: Part Five – Bivens and
1983, VETTING ROOM (Mar. 21, 2017), https://vettingroom.org/2017/03/21/judge-neilgorsuch-nominee-to-be-associate-justice-of-the-supreme-court-part-five-bivens-and-1983/
[https://perma.cc/9AVT-YR7B] (“In his twelve years on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch has voted
to dismiss Bivens and § 1983 cases over 60 times, while only voting to grant in a handful of
165.
166.
167.
168.
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How does Harlow fit into this history? In 1982, the year that it decided
Harlow, the Supreme Court had recently started rejecting the “ancien regime” of recognizing implied statutory causes of action. 173 And, fresh from
bruising battles in Davis and Green, the Court would soon begin rebuffing
attempts to expand Bivens beyond the confines of the first three cases. Indeed, the Court would ultimately refuse to recognize implied constitutional
claims in every subsequent case to decide the issue. 174 Harlow thus stood
astride a jurisprudential inflection point at which Bivens faced a developing
danger from several justices’ separation-of-powers concerns with the judicial
recognition of implied causes of action.
To be sure, in Butz v. Economou, the Court had said that “[t]he presence
or absence of congressional authorization for suits against federal officials is,
of course, relevant to the question whether to infer a right of action for damages for a particular violation of the Constitution” but that “once this analysis is completed, there is no reason to return again to the absence of
congressional authorization in resolving the question of immunity.” 175 Four
members of the Court had apparently disagreed with that statement even
then, however, signing on to a separate opinion dissenting in relevant part
and suggesting that the absence of congressional authorization was indeed
pertinent to the immunity issue. 176
Importantly, the defendant government officials in Harlow framed the
matter closely along the lines of the justices’ growing skepticism toward the
Bivens remedy. In his opening statement, their attorney characterized official
immunity as a means of preventing “the already slack criteria for inferring a
private cause of action from a constitutionally protected right” from being
“stretch[ed] completely out of shape.” 177 Consequently, the arc of the Court’s
jurisprudence implies a separation-of-powers connection between Bivens
and Harlow, and the defendants’ argument corroborates this connection.

cases. . . . Looking at Gorsuch’s Bivens and § 1983 jurisprudence, it is difficult to see a commitment to check government power.”).
173. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001).
174. See Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1855.
175. 438 U.S. 478, 503 (1978).
176. Economou, 438 U.S. at 525–26 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
177. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (No.
79-1738). The defendants’ attorney was also in favor of adopting an objective standard for
qualified immunity on the ground that doing so “would be a contraction of the very wide ramifications of the combination of Butz against Economou on the one side and Bivens on the other.” Id. at 22. This “combination,” the attorney said, had “generate[d] over 2,000 Bivens type
cases now pending, of which to date only nine have resulted in the award of damages.” Id. He
characterized this as “an enormous volume of litigation with dubious public policy benefit.” Id.
The briefing was of a piece. See Reply Brief for Petitioners Harlow & Butterfield, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (No. 79-1738), 1981 WL 390512, at *8–9 & n.5.
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Justice Powell’s Relevance

Strengthening this connection are the views of Justice Powell, Harlow’s
author. Dissenting in Davis and concurring in the judgment in Green, Powell
staked out an ambivalent and idiosyncratic approach to the Bivens regime—
an approach that later resonated throughout Harlow.
Powell strongly opposed recognizing implied causes of action in the
statutory setting, arguing that the practice violated constitutional separationof-powers rules. In his 1979 dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 178 for
instance, he declared that “ ‘the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has
now been made clear’ and compels us to abandon the implication doctrine.” 179
Powell’s resistance to implied causes of action carried over into the
Bivens setting, albeit to a lesser degree. In Green, Powell wrote that “the
Court’s willingness to infer federal causes of action that cannot be found in
the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doctrine of separation of powers and hardly comports with a rational system of justice.” 180 He expressed
similar sentiments in Davis. 181 He was unwilling to repudiate the Bivens regime entirely, however, and in this context, he pitched his separation-ofpowers concerns on subconstitutional terrain. 182
Notwithstanding these objections, Powell embraced the Bivens regime’s
broad understanding of the judicial role by advocating a wide berth for
“principled discretion.” 183 He said that “[a] plaintiff who seeks his remedy
directly under the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essentially legislative task.” 184 In carrying out this task, he argued, courts should
“take into account [a range of policy considerations] at least as broad as the
range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy.” 185 Powell, moreover, did not be178. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
179. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938)).
180. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 29 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
181. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 252 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority’s discussion of the federal judiciary’s purported “obligation to entertain private
suits that Congress has not authorized” and arguing that “[i]n the present case, . . . principles of
comity and separation of powers should require a federal court to stay its hand”).
182. See id. at 252–53 (stating that “at least since Bivens,” it had “been clear” that “in appropriate circumstances private causes of action may be inferred from provisions of the Constitution” but that the Court had “recognized that the principle of separation of powers
continues to have force as a matter of policy”); see also Green, 446 U.S. at 29 n.2 (Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“I do not suggest that courts enjoy the same degree of freedom to
infer causes of action from statutes as from the Constitution.”).
183. Green, 446 U.S. at 26 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Davis, 442
U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
184. Id. at 28; see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting).
185. Green, 446 U.S. at 28 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original)
(quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407
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lieve that judicial discretion to shape the contours of constitutional adjudication was limited to the question whether to recognize implied causes of action. He declared it “settled,” for instance, that “where discretion exists, a
variety of factors rooted in the Constitution may lead a federal court to refuse to entertain an otherwise properly presented constitutional claim,” citing several federalism-related abstention decisions. 186 And he implicitly
acknowledged that qualified immunity could provide a functional backstop
to undesired expansions of Bivens liability. 187
To put everything together, Powell thought that although courts could
authorize Bivens suits, they should use that authority sparingly for reasons
grounded in separation-of-powers principles—and that they should contemplate a wide range of policy considerations in doing so. Moreover, Powell
endorsed applying a similar framework to other areas where judicial discretion could influence constitutional adjudication. And he indicated an awareness that official-immunity rules could limit the effects of the Bivens regime.
It requires little imagination to see how all of this seems to have mapped
onto Powell’s majority opinion in Harlow. There, the Court set aside the direct Bivens question concerning the existence of a cause of action under the
First Amendment, 188 for the issue was apparently not properly presented. 189
But Harlow still offered an indirect opportunity to sap the strength of the
Bivens regime by bolstering qualified immunity. In short, the Court—and
especially Justice Powell—likely saw enhancing immunity protections as a
suitable substitute for reining in Bivens itself.
Powell’s case file for Harlow is consistent with this possibility in several
ways. The papers, for instance, suggest that Powell alighted on the objective
standard for qualified immunity in the middle of the drafting process: the
majority apparently had not assented to this formulation when the opinion

(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)); Davis, 442 U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(same).
186. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 253 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
187. In Green, the majority reasoned that concerns about overdeterring officials from
effectively performing their duties were irrelevant to the Bivens analysis because “qualified
immunity . . . provides adequate protection.” Green, 446 U.S. at 19. Powell’s opinion plainly
recognized the push–pull that this understanding of the two doctrines entailed: Bivens would
begin where qualified immunity ended. See id. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting that the majority concluded that “qualified immunity affords all the protection necessary to ensure the effective performance of official duties”).
188. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 820 n.36 (1982).
189. See Brief for Respondent, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (No. 79-1738),
1981 WL 389866, at *42 (“The district court’s ruling that Fitzgerald has constitutional and implied statutory causes of action was not appealable as a collateral order, nor was it certified for
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The issue was not before the court of appeals.
In their petition for a writ of certiorari, Harlow and Butterfield did not present the question for
review. Rather, they expressly informed this Court that the issue was not ‘immediately appealable’ and that it was not included in their notices of appeal to the court of appeals.” (citation
omitted) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14 n.9, Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (No. 80–
945))).

May 2019]

Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure

1431

assignment went out. 190 He also expressed concerns about the Court’s statutory-implication jurisprudence when corresponding with a colleague. 191 And
he appears to have personally requested that his clerk add a footnote disclaiming any approval of the district court’s recognition of a Bivens cause of
action and suggesting that the matter could be reconsidered on remand. 192
To be sure, the case file does not seem to spell out an anti-Bivens attitude toward qualified immunity in so many words. But the majority opinion in
Harlow is in harmony with Powell’s overarching approach to Bivens claims.
C. One Wrinkle
One wrinkle bears considering before moving on. The plaintiff in Harlow sued not only under Bivens to vindicate his First Amendment rights, but
also under two federal statutes to vindicate subconstitutional rights to testify
before Congress. 193 Neither statute “expressly create[d] a private right to sue
for damages,” and the Court remanded the question whether to recognize
implied causes of action for the lower courts to consider alongside the Bivens
issue. 194 Someone could thus argue that Harlow was not a pure Bivens case in
the way that the separation-of-powers aspect of the structural account advanced here might suggest.
Any such argument should not detain the analysis long. Notwithstanding the presence of statutory claims, the Court focused on the First Amendment claim in fashioning the standard for qualified immunity. Indeed, the
Court often discussed the doctrine as if it applied in the constitutional context only. 195 And Justice Brennan’s concurrence, which Justices Marshall and

190. See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to
Richard H. Fallon, Law Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 1, 1982), in 84 POWELL PAPERS 3,
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=casefiles
[https://perma.cc/468G-ZD63].
191. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to John Paul
Stevens, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 12, 1982), in POWELL PAPERS, supra note
190, at 11.
192. See Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., No. 80-945, Harlow v. Fitzgerald 1 (Feb. 15, 1982)
(unpublished draft opinion), in POWELL PAPERS, supra note 190, at 324 (expressing a desire to
address “the Bivens issue” in edits directed to his clerk); Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Harlow and
Butterfield v. Fitzgerald 18 n.31 (Feb. 27, 1982) (unpublished chamber draft), in POWELL
PAPERS, supra note 190, at 283 (adding a Bivens-related footnote).
193. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 805 & n.10.
194. Id. at 805–06, 819–20, 820 n.36.
195. See, e.g., id. at 814 (“In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer
the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.”). But the Court did not
always limit its discussion of qualified immunity to the constitutional context. See, e.g., id. at
819 (“Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory
or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate . . . .”).
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Blackmun joined, discussed qualified immunity vis-à-vis constitutional
claims exclusively. 196
In light of the evidence outlined here, therefore, there is little reason to
think that the incidental presence of statutory claims weakens the contention
that Harlow rested in part on separation-of-powers objections to the Bivens
regime. Indeed, for the reasons discussed below, the Court treated the violence that a qualified-immunity standard arising in the Bivens context might
do to statutory causes of action as collateral damage—or even as a welcome
consequence.
III. EXPLORING THE § 1983 EXTENSION
The Supreme Court soon expanded the Harlow standard beyond the
Bivens environment into the separate § 1983 domain. This Part begins by
outlining previous academic appraisals of that maneuver. It then reconsiders
the Court’s reasoning for stretching the Harlow standard to cover state officials, revealing a line of logic rooted in federalism concerns.
A. Previous Understandings
There was no § 1983 claim at issue in Harlow. 197 Nevertheless, the majority chose to address that context in the following footnote, which quoted
the Supreme Court’s 1978 opinion in Butz v. Economou:
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity available to state officials sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. We have found previously, however, that it would be “untenable to
draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought
against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the
Constitution against federal officials.” 198

A few scholars have suggested that this remark represented a mere statement
of fact, such that the Court reserved for another day the question whether
the new qualified-immunity standard would govern § 1983 suits. 199 But most
commentators have apparently long viewed Harlow as answering that question. 200 Moreover, in the § 1983 case of Sanborn v. Wolfel, 201 the Court

196. See, e.g., id. at 820–21 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I agree with the substantive standard announced by the Court today, imposing liability when a public-official defendant ‘knew
or should have known’ of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions.”); id. at 821 (“[T]he
clever and unusually well-informed violator of constitutional rights will not evade just punishment for his crimes.”).
197. Id. at 818 n.30 (majority opinion).
198. Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
199. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 134, at 267 & n.122.
200. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009
SUP. CT. REV. 139, 148 n.38; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and
Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—And the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 691 n.31 (2014); Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W.
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granted the petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded with
instructions for the court of appeals to consider Harlow, which had come
down just four days earlier. As is customary with “grant, vacate, and remand” (GVR) dispositions, the Court provided very little reasoning. But it
did include a quotation of the same statement from Economou on which the
footnote in Harlow relied. 202
In any event, Davis v. Scherer, 203 issued two years later by a Court with
the same composition as in Harlow and also authored by Justice Powell,
made clear that the Harlow standard governed § 1983 suits. 204 There, the
Court blessed applying Harlow to the § 1983 proceeding at bar with (among
other statements) the following portion of a footnote, which again cited
Economou: “Harlow was a suit against federal, not state, officials. But our
cases have recognized that the same qualified immunity rules apply in suits
against state officers under § 1983 and in suits against federal officers under
Bivens . . . .” 205 This footnote also pointed out that Harlow’s holding referenced “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights,” 206 which Scherer said embraced the statutory-rights component of § 1983. 207
Accordingly, the claim that the Bivens backdrop appears to have inspired the rise of Harlow-style qualified immunity is one of inclusion rather
than exclusion. Although a separation-of-powers response to the Bivens regime likely played an important part in producing the Harlow standard, it
did not constitute the whole picture. Indeed, the Court seems to have simultaneously accepted and even welcomed the prospect of expanding the new
standard into the § 1983 setting.
There are many possible reasons why the Court thought that the Harlow
model should apply in the § 1983 context. The only one that it initially cited,
however, was a desire to adhere to the statement from Economou. And that
choice has received very little scrutiny. For even when scholars appreciate
the path-dependent history of the Harlow standard, they seem often simply
to accept the Court’s snippet-like references to Economou as sufficient to justify importing that standard from the Bivens arena to the § 1983 setting. 208 A
few scholars, however, have dug a bit deeper.
Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy
Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2209 n.42 (2003); Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Note, Qualified Immunity
for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95
YALE L.J. 126, 133 n.34 (1985); Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement
the New Standard for Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 915 n.81
(1984).
201. 458 U.S. 1102 (1982).
202. Wolfel, 458 U.S. at 1102 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
203. 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
204. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 190–91, 193–95, 197.
205. Id. at 194 n.12 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
206. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
207. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 194 n.12.
208. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 200.
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In Economou, the Court stated that it would have been “untenable to
draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought
against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.” 209 As framed by an argument made by the
defendants, the question that the Court was addressing was whether to ramp
down the protection previously afforded federal officials in some actions
(absolute immunity) to match that afforded state officials in § 1983 suits
(good-faith immunity). 210 Answering in the affirmative, the Court said that
allowing federal officials to claim absolute immunity as a matter of course
would have eviscerated the Bivens regime. 211 Thus, the argument from some
scholars goes, Economou established the “equivalency between the two kinds
of constitutional tort cases . . . in a case which reduced the insulation afforded federal officials to the same level as that of their state counterparts, in order to preserve the efficacy of a parallel remedy that the Court created judijudicially.” 212
With the Harlow regime, the Court did the opposite. It increased the insulation afforded federal officials to a higher level than that of their state
counterparts and then increased the insulation afforded state officials to a
corresponding degree, with both moves reducing access to corrective
measures. 213 This exercise, the argument proceeds, improperly elevated the
mere means by which the Court adjusted official-immunity standards in
Economou (rendering them equivalent for federal and state officials) above
the more important ends for which it did so (preserving a rights-protective
cause of action). 214
Put differently, some scholars see the original sin against Economou as
Harlow’s election to strengthen the protection available to federal officials
beyond that previously available to state officials. That decision, they reason,
both disrupted the parallel nature of official immunity in the Bivens and
§ 1983 contexts and made constitutional rights more difficult to enforce.
These scholars thus conclude that the Court’s subsequent election to extend
the same protection to state officials served to obscure rather than absolve
this initial transgression. 215

209. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
210. See id. at 485–504.
211. See id. at 501.
212. Oren, supra note 134, at 982–83 (emphasis omitted).
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See Gildin, Immunizing Intentional Violations, supra note 134, at 382 (stating that
the reasoning in the Harlow footnote extending the new qualified-immunity standard to
§ 1983 cases “is facially unassailable, which no doubt accounts for its universal acceptance by
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts,” but that “[w]hen it made the policy judgment to
abrogate the subjective tier of the immunity in Harlow, the Court abandoned the leading
premise of its syllogism—that the immunity of federal officials must be no greater than the
immunity of state officers”).
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B. The Federalism Line of Logic
The preceding argument from prior scholarship looks more to the
broader context than to the specific reasoning of Economou. Aside from preserving Bivens by declining to endorse absolute immunity for such causes of
action in particular, why did the Supreme Court apparently believe it important for state and federal officials to bear equivalent burdens in general?
And why did Harlow and its progeny come to the same conclusion under
much different circumstances? Venturing answers to these questions uncovers a murky federalism connection that may help explain the Court’s decision to expand the Harlow standard into the § 1983 sphere.
1.

The Reasoning Behind Economou

Recall that in 1974, the Supreme Court extended the good-faith immunity available in § 1983 suits from the false-arrest context of Pierson v.
Ray to state-level executive action at large in Scheuer v. Rhodes. 216 Then in
1978, the Court extended the same immunity to Bivens actions in Economou. 217 The Court’s reasoning suggests at least four explanations for this aspect of Economou—which one could call the “equivalence directive.” As the
following discussion makes plain, the fourth is especially relevant here.
The first explanation turns on a broad understanding of binding precedent. “The Court’s opinion in Scheuer,” said Economou, “relied on precedents dealing with federal as well as state officials, analyzed the issue of
executive immunity in terms of general policy considerations, and stated its
conclusion . . . in the same universal terms.” 218 Consequently, Economou
concluded that “[t]he analysis presented in [Scheuer] cannot be limited to
actions against state officials.” 219 But to the extent that Scheuer, a § 1983 case,
said anything about Bivens actions, such statements were plainly dicta.
Of course, the rationales for applying a particular immunity standard in
§ 1983 suits could have carried persuasive force in the Bivens context. Hence,
the second explanation for the equivalence directive: Economou stated that
“Scheuer was intended to guide the federal courts in resolving th[e] tension”
between “the plaintiff’s right to compensation” and “the need to protect the
decisionmaking processes of an executive department” in “the myriad factual situations in which it might arise.” 220 The Court continued: “[W]e see no
reason why [Scheuer] should not supply the governing principles for resolving this dilemma in the case of federal officials.” 221 Someone could view these
statements (and others) as asserting that the same policy notions that sup-

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See supra text accompanying notes 37–41.
See supra text accompanying notes 42–43.
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 503–04 (1978).
Id. at 504.
Id. at 503.
Id.
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ported employing good-faith immunity in the § 1983 context of Scheuer
supported doing the same in the Bivens context of Economou. 222
Assuming that policy notions are a proper source of law in the Bivens
arena, it is not obvious that the considerations driving how courts handle
constitutional claims against state officials will always apply to suits against
federal officials. Basic noninterference principles would warrant pausing
over that proposition in at least some circumstances. The Court declared just
a few years before Economou, after all, that the concept of “Our Federalism”
occupies “a highly important place in our Nation’s history and its future.” 223
This concept, the Court said, requires respect for the idea that “the National
Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.” 224
Economou’s discussion of lower-court cases subsequent to Scheuer suggests a third explanation for the equivalence directive: that a two-track
standard for qualified immunity—one for state officials and one for federal
officials—would prove unworkable in practice. 225 Certainly, a single standard
would be most convenient. 226 But in Economou, at least, the losing contender
for the standard to govern federal officials was absolute immunity, which is
relatively easy to apply. 227 It is not extraordinary, moreover, for different
standards to constrain the conduct of different classes of officials. Various
federal statutes pertain only to federal actors, for instance. 228 In addition,
courts could make clear how to assess which cause of action and affiliated
immunity principles should apply to officials who act in joint federal–state
capacities. 229 And intergovernmental indemnification agreements could alleviate lingering concerns.

222. These policy notions included avoiding “the injustice, particularly in the absence of
bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion,” as well as avoiding “the danger that the threat of such liability
would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
223. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1971).
224. Id. at 44.
225. See Economou, 438 U.S. at 498–500.
226. Economou, for example, quoted one lower-court case saying that “the practical advantage of having just one federal immunity doctrine for suits arising under federal law is selfevident.” Id. at 499–500 (quoting Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1975)).
227. Id. at 485.
228. The Hatch Act provides a prominent example. See Hatch Act, P.L. 76-252, 53 Stat.
1147 (1939); see also Hatch Act, OFF. SPECIAL COUNS., https://osc.gov/Pages/HatchAct.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7KFC-WKJ7] (explaining that the Hatch Act “limits certain political activities of federal employees, as well as some state, D.C., and local government employees who
work in connection with federally funded programs”).
229. For example, issues surrounding officials acting in joint federal–state capacities often arise with respect to the National Guard. Courts appear generally to hold that constitutional-tort suits in this context sound in § 1983, not Bivens—but that the Feres doctrine and its
offspring (which bar damages actions deriving from military-related disputes, see Feres v.
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The fourth explanation for the equivalence directive is that “[t]o create a
system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state
officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head.” 230 As Economou made clear, the Bill of Rights originally
restrained federal officials only: incorporation against the states came later
with the Fourteenth Amendment. 231 So the Court suggested that it would
have offended long-held constitutional commitments to allow federal officials to escape liability for violating individual rights where their state counterparts could not. Federalism concerns appear to have helped animate the
equivalence directive from the very start.
2.

Ensuing Entreaties Toward Equivalence

The Supreme Court relied on Economou’s equivalence directive to justify extending the Harlow standard from the Bivens arena to the § 1983 setting
in Harlow, Wolfel, and Scherer. 232 Just as Economou appears to rest in significant part on federalism concerns, so too do these ensuing entreaties toward
equivalence. In particular, the Court seems to have wanted to safeguard state
actors in the name of federalism by requiring them to comply with constitutional commands no more demanding than their federal counterparts confronted.
Again, both the broader context and Justice Powell’s jurisprudence support this notion. As for context, “the Burger Court sought to revitalize constitutional federalism” in multiple areas. 233 And a handful of scholars has
long perceived a vague federalism justification for applying qualified immunity in the § 1983 setting. 234 As for Powell, he not only penned Harlow
and Scherer (and, as it turns out, suggested that the Court quote the equiva-

United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)), dispose of such claims. See, e.g., Watson v. Ark. Nat’l
Guard, 886 F.2d 1004, 1005–08 (8th Cir. 1989).
230. Economou, 438 U.S. at 504.
231. See id.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 198–205.
233. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention Is Not Illegitimate: An Essay on the Distinction Between “Legitimate” and “Illegitimate” Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Lawmaking,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 868 (2013).
234. See, e.g., Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section
1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 147, 168–69 (stating that qualified immunity “prevents federal
judges from intruding unnecessarily into areas of state and local prerogative”); Sheldon
Nahmod, The Long and Winding Road from Monroe to Connick, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 427,
427–28 (2012) (“The Court’s interest in federalism in the § 1983 setting includes an increasing
concern with federal judicial intervention in, and second-guessing of, the decisions of local
governments. Federalism, broadly defined, has affected . . . the extent of the absolute and qualified immunity of state and local government officials.”); Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J.
Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 59 (2015) (stating that “in the qualified immunity context, . . . federal courts exercise discretion to decide the constitutionality of
acts committed by state officials against the backdrop of federalism concerns”).
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lence directive in Wolfel 235), but he also authored several opinions directly
indicating a desire to rein in litigation against state-affiliated defendants or
implicating state-affiliated interests for federalism-related reasons. 236
Powell’s dissent in Owen v. City of Independence 237 is especially revealing. There, the majority held that official immunity was unavailable for municipal entities sued under § 1983. 238 Joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, Powell argued that “[i]mportant public policies” supported extending immunity protections to local governments. 239 He
contended that withholding such protections “may restrict the independence
of local governments and their ability to respond to the needs of their communities.” 240 These concerns would have naturally translated into a belief
that qualified-immunity doctrine should not have required state officials to
comply with a more intrusive standard of conduct than their federal counterparts faced. 241
In sum, the Supreme Court repeatedly justified extending the Harlow
standard from the Bivens environment to the § 1983 sphere by invoking
Economou’s statement that it would be “untenable to draw a distinction for
purposes of immunity law” between these contexts. 242 And jurisprudential
clues suggest that a central aim of employing the equivalence directive in this
way was to safeguard state actors for federalism reasons by subjecting them
to commands no more demanding than their federal counterparts confronted.
Again, Justice Powell’s Harlow papers lend this interpretation support.
They show, for instance, that it was Powell who proposed the quotation of
the equivalence directive in the Wolfel GVR. 243 And they show that when doing so, he told his colleagues that he “believe[d] that the Harlow standard

235. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
236. See George Clemon Freeman, Jr., Dedication, Justice Powell’s Constitutional Opinions, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411 (1988) (emphasizing federalism as a theme).
237. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
238. Owen, 445 U.S. at 622.
239. Id. at 667 (Powell, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 668.
241. A few other examples of relevant Powell opinions may prove helpful. As discussed
above, Powell endorsed federalism-related abstention principles in Davis v. Passman, see supra
text accompanying note 186, and as discussed below, he advocated applying more lenient
standards to state actors than federal actors when incorporating constitutional rights against
the states, see infra text accompanying notes 323–327. Powell was also a strong supporter of
state sovereign immunity. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). And three days before Harlow
was issued, he argued that § 1983 plaintiffs should be required to exhaust state administrative
remedies before bringing suit. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 531–36 (1982) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
242. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
243. Memorandum to the Conference, Lewis F. Powell, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court (June 23, 1982), in POWELL PAPERS, supra note 190, at 119.
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should be applicable” to cases arising under § 1983. 244 Given his concern for
furthering state and local interests in relevant contexts, the fact that Powell
led the charge to expand the Harlow standard into the § 1983 domain
strengthens the federalism connection posited here.
To review, prior scholarship has missed something significant about
qualified immunity. The governing standard arose in Harlow, a Bivens case,
and ample evidence suggests that this background may have contributed to
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in multiple important and overlooked respects. These include supplying two potential justifications for enhancing the
protection afforded by qualified immunity, both of which sound in constitutional structure. First, in articulating the Harlow standard, the Court appears
to have responded to a perceived separation-of-powers problem underlying
Bivens’s increase in liability with a corresponding increase in immunity. Second, in extending the Harlow standard from Bivens actions to § 1983 suits,
the Court appears to have relied on a perceived federalism-related imperative not to hold state officials to a higher bar than federal officials encountered.
C. Two Qualifications
Two qualifications are appropriate at this point. First, the focus here is
on a particular structural account of qualified immunity—and, therefore, on
Harlow, which most clearly crystallized this account. But the intent is not to
imply that one should view these considerations of constitutional structure
as the only, or even the primary, inputs in producing the doctrine—or that
one should see Harlow’s publication as the only, or even the primary, moment that matters. Other forces, including additional structural factors and
the factors on the face of the justices’ opinions, have surely played a role in
shaping the Court’s thinking about qualified immunity. The primary consequence of this qualification is that the case for rejecting the doctrine must
turn on analyses beyond the present examination. The discussion below thus
explores the upshots of the structural account advanced here for the propriety of qualified immunity more generally. 245
Second, this examination emphasizes Justice Powell’s positions. This is a
valuable exercise because Powell authored Harlow and other pertinent opinions. But an individual justice does not a Supreme Court make. The discussion here thus points to Powell’s opinions primarily as underappreciated
representatives of larger movements. Other justices, of course, have made
significant marks on constitutional-tort jurisprudence too. Future projects
examining such contributions should therefore prove fruitful in further illuminating this area.

244.
245.

Id.
See infra Section IV.C.
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IV. ASSESSING THE STRUCTURAL ACCOUNT
The discussion so far has mostly sought to establish a structural account
of qualified immunity as a descriptive matter. This Part assesses the normative purchase of this account. The conclusion is that neither the separationof-powers principles nor the federalism concerns explored here provide sufficient support for the Harlow standard as applied in Bivens actions or § 1983
suits, respectively.
Some preliminary observations provide an important preface. Scholars
rarely evaluate qualified immunity in a bifurcated way. But the fact that the
Harlow standard developed along separate paths for Bivens actions and
§ 1983 suits helps illustrate why one should analyze the doctrine along distinct lines in these different contexts. Moreover, qualified immunity is not
necessarily susceptible to the same criticisms in the federal-common-law setting of Bivens and the statutory setting of § 1983. And even if qualified immunity runs afoul of good interpretive principles on an a priori basis in the
§ 1983 domain, opponents cannot rest their case against the doctrine without confronting subsequent questions. Is the Harlow standard nevertheless
justifiable in the Bivens context? If so, does that render it justifiable on an a
posteriori basis in the § 1983 context?
Attempting to provide some answers, this Part appraises the merits and
demerits of the separation-of-powers and federalism aspects of the structural
account advanced here. These potential justifications for the current qualified-immunity regime are powerful in many respects. But they ultimately fail
to vindicate the Harlow standard in either of the spaces in which they apply.
A. The Separation-of-Powers Line of Logic
Inherent in Supreme Court jurisprudence is the notion that the Harlow
standard lessens the impact of Bivens in allowing courts to recognize implied
constitutional claims. To assess whether this notion offers a legitimate separation-of-powers justification for the current qualified-immunity regime, the
analysis must account for the perspectives of both Bivens advocates and
Bivens antagonists.
1.

If Bivens Is Not Broken

For those who believe that the Bivens regime rests on a lawful foundation, two primary possibilities present themselves. First, invoking the maxim
ubi jus, ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy), some observers have argued that the Constitution commands that courts recognize
Bivens claims, at least for some alleged violations or at least absent an effective alternative means for fully vindicating constitutional rights. 246 These ar-

246. Akhil Amar has advanced a well-known version of this argument. See Akhil Reed
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1485 (1987) (“The legal rights against
governments enshrined in the Constitution strongly imply corresponding governmental obli-
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guments have often enlisted, to quote a proponent, “one of the most important and inspiring passages” 247 from Marbury v. Madison. 248 This passage
proclaims that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury”—and that “[o]ne of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.” 249
Second, some commentators think that the Constitution permits, but
does not require, the judiciary to recognize implied constitutional causes of
action—at least, again, absent an effective alternative. 250 A prominent version of this view contends that the Bivens doctrine simply provides a damages remedy where both a legal right and jurisdiction to adjudicate that right
already exist—and that courts have long possessed authority to select among
traditional remedies under such circumstances. 251
Someone who backs Bivens on either of these bases is unlikely to perceive a separation-of-powers problem necessitating a qualified-immunity solution. 252 Under the starkest version of the former view, in which each right
always requires the availability of a damages remedy, qualified immunity
must be unconstitutional. And even under the latter, more lenient view, adherents would seem likely to believe that the Bivens regime represents “a
gations to ensure full redress whenever those rights are violated.”); id. at 1507 (discussing how
Bivens “partially fulfilled” this principle). And John Harrison offers an insightful take. See John
Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1021 (2008) (stating that “[t]he Fourth and
Eighth Amendments . . . are among the Constitution’s closest analogs to the law of tort,” such
that “[i]f the tort-like rules that they impose on government officers differ from the rules the
ordinary private law imposes on private people, then it is certainly plausible to say that they
must have their own tort-like remedy because they have their own tort-like content”). For other work in this general vein, see, for example, Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The SelfExecuting Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995).
247. Amar, supra note 246, at 1486.
248. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
249. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
250. Fallon and Meltzer’s theory of constitutional remedies fits into this category. Their
article on constitutional remedies argues that “Marbury’s apparent promise of effective redress
for all constitutional violations reflects a principle, not an ironclad rule.” Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 124, at 1778. The article therefore calls it “regrettable, but tolerable” that “[t]here historically always have been, and predictably will continue to be, cases in which effective
individual redress is unavailable.” Id. at 1789. But “[w]hat would be intolerable,” it says, “is a
regime of public administration that was systematically unanswerable to the restraints of law.”
Id. The piece thus concludes that the primary question in deciding whether to recognize various constitutional remedies should be whether “an overall structure of remedies adequate to
preserve” governmental accountability exists. Id.
251. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236–48 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 405 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
the judgment).
252. This also holds true for those who back Bivens on a third basis: that subsequent legislative events have “preserve[d] and ratif[ied] the Bivens remedy” in a manner that “puts the
Bivens action on a much firmer federal statutory foundation, analogous if not identical to
§ 1983.” James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121, 123 (2009).
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central means of vindicating, rather than aggrandizing, separated powers”
because “the purpose of constitutional rights is to constrain the political
branches, and not the other way around.” 253 At bottom, this position affords
courts substantial policymaking leeway, so the issue largely becomes whether
the contours of qualified immunity make good sense. And for all of the reasons that others have adduced (ranging from Chemerinsky’s correctivejustice concerns to Huq’s distributive considerations to Schwartz’s practical
problems—and beyond 254), any attempt at defending the Harlow standard
on policy grounds faces an uphill battle.
The separation-of-powers aspect of the structural account advanced
here arises from an ostensibly restorative relationship between Harlow and
Bivens. But this logic appears unlikely to persuade those who see no need to
restore anything in the first place, and at any rate, the question largely collapses into a policy debate that advocates of qualified immunity appear to be
losing. If Bivens is not broken, why fix it?
2.

Silver Bullet or Square Peg

Others, of course, reject Bivens, viewing the regime as a judicial usurpation of legislative power (either as an initial or ongoing matter, setting aside
different theories of stare decisis). Should these people see qualified immunity as a silver bullet for some portion of the Bivens problem, or should they
see Harlow as having tried to fit a square peg into a round hole? The essence
of the separation-of-powers reasoning explored above is that qualified immunity serves as a judge-made fix to a judge-made failure. But even for those
who are amenable to such a consequentialist course of thought, the reasoning should fall flat.
Drawing on work by philosopher David Hume, Adrian Vermeule describes counteracting institutional maneuvers in constitutional implementation as “compensating adjustments.” 255 Put simply, this is “the idea that
253. Vladeck, supra note 168 (emphasis omitted); see Martin H. Redish, Federal Common
Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW.
U. L. REV. 761, 796–97 (1989) (reasoning that “the unrepresentativeness of the federal judiciary . . . imposes a political obligation on the judiciary to enforce the countermajoritarian norms
of the Constitution,” such that it “is consistent with constitutional democratic theory to entrust
to the judiciary the final say as how best to enforce and protect basic constitutional rights and
interests”). Of course, someone who supports the Bivens remedy in some instances could also
take a big-picture approach to questions about the availability of constitutional-tort causes of
action and official-immunity doctrines, eschewing all-or-nothing answers in favor of seeking
the best balance between the competing concerns driving doctrinal developments as a package.
See Fallon, supra note 72, at 480. While someone who takes this approach could be relatively
open to qualified immunity, it would still stand to reason that “immunity doctrine, as currently
framed, rests on a number of shaky assumptions” and that “there might be better tools for
achieving the same purposes.” Id. at 481.
254. See supra Section I.B.
255. Adrian Vermeule, Hume’s Second-Best Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421
(2003). Others described the concept of compensating adjustments in American constitutional
implementation before Vermeule’s article. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth
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multiple departures from the optimal or first-best constitutional arrangements might offset each other,” thereby “ensur[ing] constitutional equilibrium.” 256 This model seeks “simultaneously to identify both a departure from
optimal constitutional design and an offsetting institutional adjustment that
compensates for the initial defect.” 257 For instance:
If constitutional doctrine has permitted excessive delegations from Congress to the President—excessive on either an originalist or a functional account—then a laudable compensating adjustment would be to allow the
legislative veto, congressional restrictions on the appointments power, and
other structural innovations intended to check the presidential power, even
if those innovations would otherwise be unconstitutional. 258

And:
If the President’s veto power has been effectively undermined by the increasing incidence of omnibus legislation, which puts the President to an illegitimate all-or-nothing choice, then a laudable compensating adjustment
would be to treat the Constitution as affording the President a line-item veto, even if that is not the best textual or original interpretation of the veto
power. 259

Other examples abound. 260
Vermeule calls this theory “second-best constitutionalism” for a reason. 261 The whole idea rests on the notion that a first-best option exists. And
that notion rests on the further notion that the constitution in question provides a determinative-enough rule of decision along whatever dimension the
interpreter favors (originalism, pragmatism, etc.).
This observation produces two pertinent corollaries. First, only where
the first-best option is actually or practically unavailable should one accept a
second-best state of affairs. It may be preferable, therefore, to insist on restoring the former, if possible, rather than assent to enduring the latter. 262
Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 26 (1988); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and
the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1994). Still others have made valuable contributions to understandings
of the concept since Vermeule’s article. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine:
Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1733 (2005). I focus on Vermeule’s work, however, largely because of the relative clarity and
detail with which he isolates and addresses the theoretical issues discussed here.
256. Vermeule, supra note 255, at 421.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 432 (footnotes omitted).
259. Id.
260. See id. at 429–33; see also Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20–23 (2009).
261. Vermeule, supra note 255, at 421.
262. Vermeule assumes “an irreversible departure from, or violation of, ideal constitutional design.” Id. at 426. And he notes that “[t]he analogy here is to a technical idea in economics” that applies “[i]f perfect efficiency cannot be obtained.” Id. at 431 (citing R.G. Lipsey
& R.K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956)).
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Second, not all compensating adjustments are created equal. “A standard
conceptual objection is that the policy of adjustment is indeterminate, as the
interpreter may choose the margin on which the adjustment is made,” Vermeule explains. 263 For instance, “[i]f sweeping delegations produce excessive
presidential power, why adjust by upholding the legislative veto, as opposed
to, say, granting Congress the commander-in-chief power?” 264 Vermeule
counters that second-best constitutionalism gives rise to some “easy cases.” 265 For instance, he says, “[i]f the growth of omnibus legislation has undermined the veto power, we need no elaborate theoretical apparatus to
appreciate that permitting the (otherwise suspect) line-item veto is a more
fitting compensating adjustment than, say, making the veto immune from
congressional override.” 266
Vermeule thus argues that some compensating adjustments are better
than others, but he offers little explanation for why that may be. Baude advances the ball a bit. He draws a contrast between appropriate compensating
adjustments on the one hand and Justice Scalia’s justification for qualified
immunity in Crawford-El v. Britton on the other. 267 Recall that this justification contends that qualified immunity is permissible because Harlow contracted liability after Monroe v. Pape had incorrectly expanded it. 268 Baude
points out that “[i]f one looks with a wide enough lens, one might say that
it’s enough that the first decision erroneously expanded the number of lawsuits and the second decision will decrease the number of lawsuits.” 269 But,
he asserts, “with the lens that wide nearly every doctrine of constitutional
law and civil procedure would be swept in,” meaning that “[t]he theory
would not provide special justification for the doctrine of qualified immunity.” 270 Instead, “to the extent that the original scheme had an animating purpose or logic, one would expect the adjustment to be consistent with that
purpose.” 271
What Vermeule and Baude appear to be driving toward is a distinction
between the scope and substance of compensating adjustments. The best
compensating adjustments, the thinking goes, respond not only to the quantitative aspects of the initial departures from optimal constitutional design

263. Id. at 433–34.
264. Id. at 434.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Baude, supra note 3, at 63, 68–69.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 101–105.
269. Baude, supra note 3, at 68.
270. Id.
271. Id. Thus, with respect to Scalia’s Crawford-El justification for qualified immunity,
Baude says that “it would be a far closer approximation to the Frankfurterian scheme to require that § 1983 claims be exhausted or to substantively alter the doctrine for certain kinds of
constitutional claims.” Id. at 68–69 (footnote omitted); see supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text.
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by offering modifications of roughly analogous scope. They respond also to
the qualitative aspects of the initial departures by offering modifications of
roughly antagonistic substance. The latter feature seems to entail advantages
of both principle and practicality, allowing compensating adjustments to address problems in particularized ways and to operate where the problems actually exist. So one might say that actions ought to have both equal and
opposite reactions in the context of compensating adjustments.
This framework helps show why addressing sweeping delegations by allowing the legislative veto would be preferable to granting Congress the
commander-in-chief power. The legislative veto would both reduce the
problematic scope of presidential power in this context, its “excessive” quantity (to quote Vermeule), 272 and better counter the problematic substance of
such power, its legislative quality. To combat increasing omnibus legislation,
permitting the line-item veto would be superior to making the veto immune
from congressional override for similar reasons. The line-item veto would
both strengthen the veto power and bear a closer connection to the cause of
the concern—Congress’s insistence on putting the president to “an illegitimate or all-or-nothing choice” (to quote Vermeule again). 273
Applying this framework to the issue at hand suggests that qualified
immunity represents a poor compensating adjustment for the separation-ofpowers error ostensibly underlying the Bivens regime—or at least derives no
“special justification” from that error. 274
Returning to the two corollaries outlined above fleshes out why. 275 First,
a compensating adjustment is necessary only where there has been an irreversible departure from optimal constitutional design. 276 From an antiBivens perspective, the departure here is a separation-of-powers problem: in
recognizing implied constitutional causes of action, courts allegedly invade
Congress’s domain. Any such problem, however, does not arise in the § 1983
context, and courts apply the same form of qualified immunity there. Of
practical necessity, the range of a solution may sometimes exceed the range
of the corresponding problem. This appears to be the case for both of the examples drawn from Vermeule’s work above. It would be difficult to limit the
legislative veto to sweeping delegations for all of the reasons that the nondelegation doctrine requires hard line-drawing decisions. And similar challenges would likely beset efforts to confine the line-item veto to omnibus
legislation. But there are good reasons why the Harlow standard need not
govern both Bivens actions and § 1983 suits. 277 Consequently, even assuming
that spillover effects are inevitable and therefore tolerable for some second-

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Vermeule, supra note 255, at 434.
Id. at 432.
Baude, supra note 3, at 68.
See supra notes 262–273 and accompanying text.
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.B.1.
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best solutions (a question that deserves further academic attention), the present situation is not necessarily one of them.
Furthermore, overruling Bivens may be better than tolerating Harlowstyle qualified immunity. This is especially so because Congress could respond by providing an express cause of action in Bivens’s place, thereby alleviating the separation-of-powers ailment allegedly afflicting the current
system.
Second, the best compensating adjustments respond to departures from
optimal constitutional design in both scope and substance. 278 Here again, the
scope of Harlow’s separation-of-powers solution is overinclusive in the
§ 1983 setting because there is no separation-of-powers problem to which
qualified immunity could respond. And it may be overinclusive or underinclusive (or both) in the Bivens arena. One simply does not know and cannot
realistically ascertain the number (or nature) of Bivens actions that Congress
would want courts to eliminate through an immunity mechanism.
More significantly, as for substance, the supposed solution fundamentally fails to address—and instead arguably exacerbates—the purported problem. Just as one can believe that Congress rather than the judiciary should
craft federal causes of action, one can believe that Congress rather than the
judiciary should generally craft federal defenses (subject to the understanding that statutory enactments incorporate common-law defenses absent contrary indications 279). But as Pfander has observed, the Supreme Court’s
repeated refusals to expand the Bivens regime through unilateral action contrast sharply with its “remarkable willingness to re-fashion the rules of qualified immunity . . . without awaiting legislative guidance.” 280 This creates a
“juxtaposition” indicative of a “Janus-faced,” “on-again, off-again attitude
toward the legitimacy of judge-made law.” 281
A comparative peek at two passages from Ziglar v. Abbasi illustrates this
point. In addressing whether a Bivens action was available, the Court explained that separation-of-powers concerns mandate the careful consideration of “ ‘who should decide’ whether to provide for a damages remedy,
Congress or the courts?” 282 The majority declared that “[t]he answer most
often will be Congress.” 283 In particular, the Court said, “[w]hen an issue ‘involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised,’ it
should be committed to ‘those who write the laws’ rather than ‘those who
278. See supra notes 263–273 and accompanying text.
279. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079, 1099 (2017) (“Statutes of course trump unwritten rules, just as new statutes trump old
ones. But an unwritten legal rule, like an old statute, governs of its own force until something
else abrogates it. A common law duress defense might interrupt the operation of a criminal
statute, even though the statute outranks the defense.”).
280. Pfander, supra note 138, at 1391.
281. Id. at 1391, 1405.
282. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
380 (1983)).
283. Id.
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interpret them.’ ” 284 For “[i]t is not necessarily a judicial function to establish
whole categories of cases in which federal officers must defend against personal liability claims in the complex sphere of litigation, with all of its burdens on some and benefits to others.” 285 In the Bivens context, the Court
said, these burdens include both the monetary costs accompanying “defense
and indemnification” and “the time and administrative costs attendant upon
intrusions resulting from the discovery and trial process.” 286
A few pages later, Abbasi addressed qualified immunity. There, the
Court described how its own precedent “seeks a proper balance between two
competing interests.” 287 On the one hand, the Court remarked, “damages
suits ‘may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional
guarantees.’ ” 288 But on the other, “permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that
fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.” 289 Accordingly, Abbasi explained,
“[a]s one means to accommodate these two objectives,” the Court has sought
to “give[] officials ‘breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.’ ” 290
These passages are in some tension. The Court’s tone suggests, after all,
that it is largely illegitimate for the judiciary to determine which claims
should proceed based on competing cost considerations in the Bivens context but perfectly fine for it to do the same thing in the qualified-immunity
context. 291 Perhaps the Court was only half-serious in saying that such issues
“should be committed to ‘those who write the laws’ rather than ‘those who
interpret them’ ”? 292
In short, the two possible separation-of-powers wrongs represented by
these passages do not make a constitutional right in the same manner as the
compensating adjustments that Vermeule endorses. And that is so for reasons similar to Baude’s argument for why qualified immunity represents a
problematic response to Scalia’s criticism of the Monroe regime in CrawfordEl. 293 Even if the doctrine addresses the scope of the departure from optimal

284. Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380 (1983)).
285. Id. at 1858.
286. Id. at 1856.
287. Id. at 1866.
288. Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
289. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)).
290. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)).
291. Perhaps one way to think about these two contexts is that they both pertain to “beneficial powers” of the judiciary and should therefore stand or fall together. See Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 735, 743 (2001).
292. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 380 (1983)).
293. See supra notes 101–109 and accompanying text.
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constitutional design in a proportional way, which is far from clear, it fails to
address the substance of the departure in a principled manner. 294
These impressions are all contestable. Thoroughgoing consequentialists
could refuse to worry themselves with the means of undermining judges’
ability to recognize implied constitutional claims where the ends of qualified
immunity accomplish this goal. 295 But anti-Bivens individuals would seem
more likely to subscribe to formalist modes of constitutional reasoning than
pervasively consequentialist ones. Otherwise, they would be unlikely to embrace the relatively rigid separation-of-powers principles that lead many to
reject the Bivens regime. Other skeptics might contend that three-plus decades of legislative silence in declining to supersede Harlow by statute demonstrate approval of the decision. 296 But inaction is a thin reed on which to rest
a doctrine as momentous as qualified immunity. And numerous institutional
forces combine to favor stasis over advance even in some instances where a
majority of congresspeople would endorse a proposal in the abstract. 297 On
balance, therefore, the separation-of-powers aspect of the structural account
advanced here appears to provide no persuasive argument for qualified immunity in the Bivens context (at least over and above any number of other
ways that one could reduce the sum of such suits).
B. The Federalism Line of Logic
Now assume that a separation-of-powers rationale—or any other rationale, for that matter—justifies qualified immunity in the Bivens context.
Would some principle of federalism then justify applying the Harlow stand-

294. One could ask what an appropriate compensating adjustment might look like. To
the extent that Bivens empowers courts at the expense of Congress, an ideal modification
would involve empowering Congress at the expense of courts along some related line. Perhaps,
for example, the legislature should be allowed to nullify the outcome of Bivens verdicts, contra
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), and possibly due-process principles. A less
drastic maneuver (although arguably not a classical compensating adjustment) might involve
conditioning the availability of Bivens actions on the absence of effective alternative congressional remedies. As it happens, however, Bivens doctrine has long incorporated just such a
principle (albeit not limited to congressional remedies), see Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858, which
may simply show that Bivens has not taken the legal system as far afield from optimal constitutional design as some suggest. The point is that variations like these, unlike the Harlow standard, would embody some attempt to respond to the substance, not just the scope, of
separation-of-powers concerns with the Bivens regime.
295. See Baude, supra note 3, at 68 (suggesting that the power of Scalia’s Crawford-El dissent “depends a lot on how brutal a compensating adjustment is allowed to be”).
296. See id. at 80 (suggesting the argument that “[b]ecause qualified immunity has been
on the books for years and Congress has declined to revisit it, it may have obtained a belated
Congressional imprimatur”).
297. There is a great deal of literature on this topic, of course. But Judge Easterbrook put
the matter especially well when he wrote that “[t]here are a hundred ways in which a bill can
die even though there is no opposition to it.” Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533, 538 (1983); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction,
87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 98–99 (1988).
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ard in the § 1983 context, as the Supreme Court has suggested by repeatedly
relying on the equivalence directive from Butz v. Economou? Three such
theories bear considering: an equal-sovereignty principle arising from structural inferences, the incorporation doctrine arising from Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the congruence-and-proportionality concept
arising from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1.

Equal Sovereignty

Equal sovereignty is a prominent yet provocative concept. The notion
became notorious after the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County
v. Holder, 298 where Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion declared that
“[n]ot only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also
a ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States.” 299 Shelby
County acknowledged that the concept first emerged in the context of “the
admission of new States” into the Union. 300 The Court insisted, however,
that “the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.” 301 Shelby County
proceeded to invalidate an important provision of the Voting Rights Act that
subjected different states to different standards. 302
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent countered that beyond the admission context,
equal sovereignty existed only as dicta in another opinion by Roberts, 303
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder. 304 Scholars
tend to agree. 305 Indeed, Shelby County “prompted savage criticism not only
from the left, but also from the right.” 306
Shelby County’s arguable conception of equal sovereignty as presumptively proscribing disparate treatment among the states is controversial
enough. No one appears to have endorsed a similar principle proscribing
298. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
299. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 544 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 544–57.
303. Id. at 587–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
304. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
305. See, e.g., Jon Greenbaum et al., Shelby County v. Holder: When the Rational Becomes
Irrational, 57 HOW. L.J. 811, 852–54 (2014); Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion
of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 732–33 (2014); Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 2109, 2133–34 (2015); Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV.
1207, 1208–12 (2016).
306. Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087,
1089–90 & nn.5–9 (2016) (collecting sources); see also Jeffrey M. Schmitt, In Defense of Shelby
County’s Principle of Equal State Sovereignty, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 209, 210 & nn.8–14 (2016) (collecting sources and noting that “[s]cholars have attacked the equal sovereignty principle with a
surprising degree of unanimity and contempt”).
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disparate treatment between the states on the one hand and the federal government on the other. And the elemental structure of American government—as reflected, for instance, in the text of the Supremacy Clause 307—
would contradict any such contention.
Some scholars, however, have offered a more nuanced theory of equal
sovereignty. The key, they claim, is not equal treatment in all circumstances,
but equal respect for basic sovereign prerogatives. 308 Because the states retained and the federal government received the fundamental attributes of
sovereignty at the founding, 309 this theory would seem to require a minimum
measure of equality between the two levels of government. Accordingly, one
could argue that the same standard for qualified immunity must govern both
Bivens actions and § 1983 suits to the extent that constitutional-tort litigation would otherwise infringe basic sovereign prerogatives.
But for at least two reasons, constitutional-tort actions against government officials in their personal capacities do not appear to violate any such
principles. First, important to arguments about state sovereignty is a theory
about what the concept entails. Timothy Zick, for instance, invokes socialconstruction theory to derive four “constitutive rules” of state sovereignty. 310
These include the “rule of preservation,” which protects the “necessary existence” of states within the constitutional system; the “rule of separateness,”
which provides that states retain “exclusive control” over composing their
governments; the “rule of participation,” which “preserves a substantial role
for the states in national governance”; and the “rule of interpretive independence,” which “provides that the states should generally be free to interpret their own laws and constitutions.” 311
Zick notes that these rules define a baseline rather than the boundaries
of state sovereignty. 312 But there is little reason to think that § 1983 suits affront this or any other credible model of the concept. States have no legitimate interests in allowing their officials to violate federal constitutional
rights. And states are not required to satisfy § 1983 judgments from their
public fiscs. 313 Indeed, the idea that constitutional-tort litigation against gov-

307. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”).
308. See Colby, supra note 306, at 1148–59; Schmitt, supra note 306, at 219–22.
309. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (“It is incontestible that the
Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’ Although the States surrendered many
of their powers to the new Federal Government, they retained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991), and THE
FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
310. Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 288–93 (2005).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 292.
313. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68–69, 69 n.24 (1997).
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ernment officials in their personal capacities offends state sovereignty would
run counter to the tenet that such suits generally do not impose constitutionally significant burdens on states qua states. 314 Naturally, responding to
§ 1983 suits against individual officers may effectively require states to expend resources (by, say, handling discovery requests). But courts do not generally consider indirect obligations in analogous contexts suspect. 315 And the
financial burden does not seem substantial enough to raise the kind of statesovereignty concerns that have caused the Supreme Court to condemn federal actions in other areas. 316
At bottom, the constitutional dimensions of § 1983 neither require nor
forbid any “primary conduct” that the Bill of Rights, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not already regulate. 317 So the notion that constitutionaltort litigation against state officials infringes basic sovereign prerogatives
would seem fairly far-fetched.
The second reason that constitutional-tort actions against individual officials do not appear to disturb any basic sovereign prerogatives is that federal authority may reach its zenith—and equal-sovereignty concerns, their
nadir—when the government implements the Reconstruction Amendments, 318 as § 1983 does. 319 To quote Thomas Colby:
Reconstruction probably did not radically alter the basic architecture of
federalism generally, including the inherent structural principle of equal
state sovereignty, but it did bring about a sea change in the federal–state
balance in one particular regard: the ability of the federal government to
protect the fundamental rights of the people from state infringement. 320

Put simply, “the history supports a claim that Congress should be afforded
greater leeway to bend the equal sovereignty principle when it is acting pursuant to its Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
powers.” 321 Thus, the civil-rights setting may make it permissible for quali314. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104–05 (1984). Although this principle is plainly contestable in the injunction environment, it stands on firmer
logical and historical footing in the damages domain. See id. at 109 n.21.
315. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523 (1988) (“[U]nder current intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine the States can never tax the United States directly but can tax
any private parties with whom it does business, even though the financial burden falls on the
United States, as long as the tax does not discriminate against the United States or those with
whom it deals.”).
316. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (holding the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion unconstitutionally coercive
for threatening states with potentially crippling budgetary losses).
317. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 559–60 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
318. See Colby, supra note 306, at 1159–70; see also Schmitt, supra note 306, at 248–51.
319. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (stating that § 1983 represents “one of
the means whereby Congress exercised the power vested in it by § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce the provisions of that Amendment”).
320. Colby, supra note 306, at 1167–68 (footnotes omitted).
321. Id. at 1168.
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fied immunity to overstep any otherwise applicable equal-sovereignty principle.
All in all, no one seems to have proposed that an equal-sovereignty principle governs the relationship between the states and the federal government;
any equal-treatment version appears groundless; any sovereign-prerogatives
version appears inapposite given the limited impact of personal-capacity
constitutional-tort suits on states qua states; and § 1983’s foundation in the
Fourteenth Amendment renders the appeal of any such principle especially
tenuous in the present context.
2.

The Fourteenth Amendment

Contemplating the Fourteenth Amendment calls to mind two more potential bases for the equivalence directive, the first sounding in Section 1 and
the second, in Section 5.
The Supreme Court has concluded that Section 1’s Due Process
Clause 322 incorporates at least most of the Bill of Rights against the states. 323
Early cases adopted a model where “even when a right set out in the Bill of
Rights was held to fall within the conception of due process, the protection
or remedies afforded against state infringement sometimes differed from the
protection or remedies provided against abridgement by the Federal Government.” 324 The Court later “abandoned” this model as “ ‘incongruous,’ ”
holding that “incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same
standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.’ ” 325 But Justice Powell resisted this move, arguing that the Court
should continue to distinguish between the content of the Bill of Rights and
the content of due process. 326 Holding states to the same standards as the
federal government, he said, “derogates principles of federalism that are
basic to our system,” particularly the principle of allowing the states “freedom to experiment” with policies “different from the federal model.” 327

322. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
323. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–59 (2010); see also Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019). Justice Thomas, however, has advanced a substantial argument that Section 1’s Privileges or Immunities Clause actually performs this function. See
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805–50 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 691–93 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
324. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 761 (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949),
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), and Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473
(1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963)).
325. Id. at 765 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)).
326. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring in Johnson
and concurring in the judgment in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)); see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 766 n.14 (explaining that Powell alone held this view in Apodaca).
327. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 375–76 (Powell, J., concurring).

May 2019]

Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Structure

1453

The question whether the Harlow standard should govern § 1983 suits
does not concern incorporation, of course. But it does concern whether “incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against the States
under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that
protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.’ ” 328 And it also
concerns the extent to which states enjoy the “freedom to experiment” with
policies “different from the federal model.” 329 Consequently, one could view
the equivalence directive as an analogical compromise between the majority’s position and Powell’s position on the incorporation issue.
One could also look to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 330 to
support employing the equivalence directive in the Harlow context. In 1997,
the Supreme Court described the contours of Congress’s power under this
provision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 331 which invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as applied against the states. RFRA had reinstated the framework that governed the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause before the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith. 332 For
Congress to legislate under Section 5, Flores said, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end.” 333 RFRA, the Court held, ran afoul of
this rule because it was substantive, not prophylactic or remedial, in nature. 334 This, the Court said, constituted “a considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate
for the health and welfare of their citizens.” 335
What does Flores have to do with Harlow? Although Harlow was formally a remedial decision, one could characterize it as functionally restricting the substance of individual rights in the context of damages suits against
federal officials. Indeed, it is not unusual for scholars to do so. 336 Under this
view, someone could argue that § 1983 could not call for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment more strictly against state officials than Harlow calls for
enforcing individual rights against federal officials without transgressing the
congruence-and-proportionality concept (or an anticipatory variant of the
concept, since Harlow predates Flores). Put differently, § 1983 arguably represents an appropriate remedial measure under the federalism principles

328. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964)).
329. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 375–76 (Powell, J., concurring).
330. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
331. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
332. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see Flores, 521 U.S. at 512.
333. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520.
334. Id. at 529–36.
335. Id. at 534.
336. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 72, at 485 (“[O]fficial immunity doctrines perform an
equilibrating function by diminishing the social costs that constitutional rights would have if
officers who violated them were always strictly liable in suits for damages.”).
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embodied in Section 5 only if it includes the defense of Harlow-style qualified immunity. The protection afforded by that standard, after all, sets the
lowest common denominator between the schemes for holding federal officials versus state officials accountable in damages for constitutional violations.
These potential justifications for expanding the Harlow standard into
the § 1983 sphere may seem promising, but for several reasons, neither succeeds. To start, the Supreme Court does not appear to have drawn any connection between the scope of the Harlow standard and Section 1 or 5. So the
intent underlying the expansion likely had nothing to do with avoiding
problems under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In addition, any principle that arises from Section 1 or 5 ought to govern
all matters implicating those provisions. At a minimum, this set includes all
§ 1983 claims involving the Bill of Rights (for Section 1 undergirds the general ability to enforce such rights against the states, 337 and Section 5 undergirds the specific ability to do so through a congressionally created cause of
action 338). But qualified immunity applies only to claims for damages against
executive officials involving discretionary conduct. 339 It does not apply, for
instance, to claims for injunctive relief, 340 claims against municipal entities, 341 or claims involving nondiscretionary behavior. 342 If some model of
qualified immunity represented a constitutional minimum required by Section 1 or 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it should reach those kinds of
claims under § 1983 as well. Although this point does not directly address
whether the qualified-immunity standards applicable to state and federal defendants must match one another, it provides a powerful argument against
locating any such imperative in Section 1 or 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Setting the functionalist perspective momentarily aside, there is little
reason to think that § 1983 operates as a backdoor for dictating the content
of constitutional rights. Section 1983 is far more plainly remedial than RFRA
was, 343 simply making a cause of action available for certain independent
wrongs. 344 To quote the Supreme Court, although reasonable minds could
“disagree[] regarding the scope of Congress’s ‘prophylactic’ enforcement
337. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 754–66 (2010).
338. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
339. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 818 (1982).
340. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009).
341. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
342. Some decisions hold that qualified immunity does not apply to suits challenging
merely ministerial actions. See, e.g., Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001).
Others hold that qualified immunity does not apply to suits challenging conduct that falls beyond the scope of the defendant’s job responsibilities. See, e.g., Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.
Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265–67 (11th Cir. 2004).
343. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (“RFRA cannot be considered
remedial . . . .”).
344. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 559–60 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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powers” under Section 5, “no one doubts” that Section 5 “grants Congress
the power to ‘enforce . . . the provisions’ of the Amendment by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions.” 345
In any event, to say that Harlow functionally restricted the substance of
individual rights may conflate rights and remedies in a fashion antithetical to
Flores itself, which maintained a “decisive distinction” between the two. 346
Or, paradoxically, if the functionalist literature is correct that rights and
remedies are ontologically inseparable ideas, 347 the congruence-andproportionality concept is problematic in the first place. Levinson, for instance, argues that “the question of whether prophylactic rules are really
remedies or really redefinitions of rights” is “empty and indeterminate.” 348
For “[i]f the very same prophylactic rules . . . may either be built into the definitions of rights or stand apart as remedies, nothing about the nature of any
given prophylactic rule will reveal whether it is ‘really’ a remedy or a
right.” 349
Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment offer plausible theoretical hooks for the otherwise amorphous inkling that federalism principles require courts to apply equivalent qualified-immunity standards to state and
federal officials. But neither provision ultimately justifies that notion.
3.

Freestanding Federalism

A proponent of the present qualified-immunity model could try to salvage the federalism rationale for applying the Harlow standard in the § 1983
setting by attempting to invoke a general norm of federal–state parallelism in
constitutional enforcement.
As an initial matter, one could respond by arguing that such a norm is
by no means universal. There is a substantial disparity between the frameworks for enforcing constitutional rights against federal and state officials,
for instance, in the sense that the range of rights that a plaintiff can vindicate
through a Bivens action is far narrower than the range of rights that a plaintiff can vindicate through a § 1983 suit.
Furthermore, some of the most prominent examples of federal–state
parallelism are distinguishable. Brown v. Board of Education 350 prohibited
racial segregation in public schools. Brown’s holding, however, applied only
to states because it arose from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 351 issued the same day as Brown, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause required

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006).
Levinson, supra note 72, at 865.
See supra text accompanying notes 72–73.
Levinson, supra note 72, at 917 (emphases omitted).
Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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the same result for Washington, D.C. The Court stated that “[i]n view of our
decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.” 352 But the actual basis for the decision was a discrete due-process rule. Segregation in
public schools, the Court held, was “not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective” and thus arbitrarily deprived black students of liberty. 353
As another example, Hurd v. Hodge 354 held that federal courts could not
enforce racially restrictive covenants, just as Shelley v. Kraemer 355 had held
for state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
In Hurd, the Court stated that “[w]e cannot presume that the public policy of
the United States manifests a lesser concern for the protection of such basic
rights against discriminatory action of federal courts than against such action taken by the courts of the States.” 356 But the actual basis for the decision
was a federal statute and, in the alternative, a contract-law doctrine. 357 Of the
latter, the Court said, “[t]he power of the federal courts to enforce the terms
of private agreements is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and
limitations of the public policy of the United States.” 358
Accordingly, in both cases, the Court grounded its reasoning in particular legal principles, not in (or at least in addition to) general concerns about
federal–state parallelism. 359 Issues of parallelism in constitutional enforcement warrant further attention. At bottom, however, attempting to justify
expanding the Harlow standard into the § 1983 setting on these grounds appears to represent an appeal to what John Manning has termed “freestanding
federalism.” 360
The Constitution, Manning contends, “defines ‘federalism’ only through
its adoption of a number of particular measures that collectively reflect the
background aim of establishing a federal system.” 361 Thus, he argues,
“[t]reating that background aim as a freestanding legal norm devalues the
choice to bargain over, settle upon, and present to the ratifying conventions
352. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
353. Id.
354. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
355. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
356. Hurd, 334 U.S. at 35–36.
357. Id. at 30–36.
358. Id. at 34–35.
359. See David E. Bernstein, Essay, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253, 1253–54 (2005) (discussing Bolling); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 409–10 (1995)
(discussing Bolling); Richard Primus, Essay, Constitutional Expectations, 109 MICH. L. REV. 91,
103 n.75 (2010) (discussing Hurd).
360. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2004 (2009).
361. Id. at 2040 (emphasis omitted).
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a cluster of relatively, even if imperfectly, specified means to achieve that
aim.” 362 One way to understand Manning’s point is that one cannot properly
conjure legal doctrine out of mere intuitions about the way that federalism
should operate in the constitutional system. 363 But that seems to be just what
the federalism aspect of the structural account advanced here entails.
In sum, neither equal sovereignty nor incorporation nor congruence
and proportionality can justify employing the equivalence directive to apply
the Harlow standard to § 1983 suits. Instead, inappropriate notions of freestanding federalism appear to lie at the heart of such reasoning. The federalism aspect of the structural account advanced here thus fails to justify the
current qualified-immunity regime.
Two additional points that support the same conclusion bear mentioning. First, the particular details of the previous discussion should not obscure
the general nature of the predicament. Congress provided an express damages action against state officials, but not federal officials, for violating constitutional rights. There are good reasons to think that the absence of a
statutory cause of action encouraged the Supreme Court to apply an especially protective qualified-immunity standard to federal officials. If that is
correct, the Court’s subsequent decision to extend the same standard to state
officials at least arguably constricted congressionally enacted text to conform
to federal common law, which seems exactly backward.
Second, the very viability of the equivalence directive depends on Harlow’s legitimacy in the Bivens environment. If qualified immunity is improper in Bivens actions, others have identified good reasons why the doctrine
should not survive for § 1983 suits either. 364 Given the many grounds for
skepticism on the Bivens front, the validity of the Harlow standard in the
§ 1983 domain seems all the more doubtful.
C. Three Upshots
The above discussion addresses the doctrine’s roots in constitutional
structure, but what are the upshots for the propriety of qualified immunity
more generally? Several answers come to mind, but an initial note may prove
helpful.
As explained above, the justices have offered various rationales for the
Supreme Court’s muscular conception of qualified immunity, and previous
scholarship has rebutted these rationales along multiple compelling, but not

362. Id.
363. For a somewhat similar point, see Ernest A. Young, Essay, Alden v. Maine and the
Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1604 (2000). Young argues that a
“big ideas” approach to constitutional structure “will frequently be helpful” in “offer[ing] determinate answers when more familiar sources, such as text and specific history, run out.” Id.
But, he contends, those who adopt this approach must maintain an “appropriate awareness” of
“potentially serious liabilities” that “aris[e] from [the] tendency to press courts toward more
complete theorization of constitutional issues.” Id.
364. See supra Section I.B.
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universally convincing, lines. The present project offers an account of the
Court’s course grounded in structural constitutional concerns. But it bears
emphasizing that the justices’ own accounts and the structural account advanced here do not cover the waterfront of possible explanations and potential justifications for the doctrine’s development. Other scholars have
identified additional considerations that played and may continue to play a
part in producing and supporting qualified immunity. 365 And still more
scholars will identify still more considerations, both descriptive and normative. In short, the rise of the current qualified-immunity regime is susceptible
of multiple coincident accounts—and even multiple structural accounts. 366
That said, the primary answer to the upshots question is that rejecting
Harlow-style qualified immunity would seem well warranted. The present
analysis has attempted to offer a more accurate and attractive account of the
defense than an exclusive focus on the justices’ explicit rationales provides.
But an adequate justification remains elusive. It is notoriously difficult to
prove a negative—in this case, that no possible basis provides sufficient support for the current qualified-immunity regime. But the burden of persuasion as to the doctrine’s propriety should rest on its proponents, and even
over thirty years after Harlow came down, they have not yet carried the
weight.
A secondary answer is that someone could reject the Harlow standard in
part, seeing qualified immunity as illegitimate in suits against state defendants but legitimate in suits against federal defendants. The present analysis
argues that the doctrine rests on different foundations in the § 1983 and
Bivens contexts. And that means that qualified immunity should be more
difficult to justify for state officials than federal officials, at least insofar as
the statutory setting of § 1983 constrains the range of available defenses
more than the federal-common-law milieu of Bivens does. So someone could
agree with the analysis here but accept qualified immunity in the Bivens domain because the possible assessments of the policy contentions for and
against the doctrine are almost endless. These contentions, after all, concern
values that are not only arguably incommensurable, but also to which people
can reasonably attach different weights—for instance, providing full vindica-

365. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 23, at 52–63 (positing a heightened concern on the Supreme Court about docket management at a time of increasing crime and incarceration rates);
Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1060–62 (2013) (connecting qualified immunity to concerns about opening the “floodgates of litigation” more generally).
366. The past and prospective role of departmentalist-type thinking in qualifiedimmunity doctrine deserves greater academic attention, for instance. See Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1713, 1746–47 (2017) (arguing that qualified immunity is “[t]he most visible” area where the Supreme Court “recognizes a
distinction between what the Constitution requires and what judicially developed doctrine has
said that the Constitution requires” and that this distinction “can be understood as an example
of judicial departmentalism in action”).
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tion to victims of governmental mistreatment on the one hand versus preventing overdeterrence of and unfairness to executive officials on the other.
A tertiary answer is that someone could see qualified immunity as legitimate in both suits against state officials and suits against federal officials despite crediting that the doctrine should be evaluated differently in these
distinct areas. To do so in a manner consistent with the contentions offered
here, however, would require rejecting either the view that the statutory setting of § 1983 substantially constrains the range of available defenses or the
work of Baude and others who have argued against the justices’ own accounts of qualified immunity as rooted in positive law. 367 Or it would require
pointing to some other justification for qualified immunity in the § 1983
context.
To be clear, Baude’s argument is not that § 1983 “permits absolutely no
immunities at all because the text is categorical on its face.” 368 Indeed, Baude
recognizes that “[u]nwritten defenses are not unknown to the law.” 369 And
scholars like Caleb Nelson have recently suggested more sophisticated understandings of federal common law than many skeptics previously propounded. 370 Baude’s argument, instead, is that “[t]he real problem with
qualified immunity is that it is so far removed from ordinary principles of
legal interpretation.” 371 Accordingly, Baude contends that “[e]xposing the
Court’s choices lets us make a clearer and more responsible decision about
whether those choices are the rights ones or whether, having given us such a
categorical immunity doctrine, the Court should now take some of it
back.” 372
The possibility of abandoning the Harlow standard naturally leads to
questions about stare decisis. Harlow’s status as Supreme Court precedent
merits respect. Stare decisis, however, “is not an inexorable command,” as
the Court has made especially clear in the qualified-immunity context. 373
And inquiring into the justifiability of qualified immunity as a matter of first
principles is important in any event. There is inherent value in understanding whether the Court has been right or wrong to embrace an immunity
standard with the apparent effect of denying monetary redress—and in
many cases, any redress—to large numbers of people who have suffered constitutional violations. And Harlow’s legitimacy bears on whether and to what
extent the Court should extend or overrule subsidiary aspects of qualifiedimmunity doctrine as well.

367. See supra Section I.B.
368. Baude, supra note 3, at 77.
369. Id.
370. See Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) Federal Common Law, 101 VA. L. REV.
1, 44 (2015).
371. Baude, supra note 3, at 77.
372. Id. at 78.
373. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
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Furthermore, and fortunately, others have begun drilling down on significant issues concerning the doctrine’s future. These issues include not only the effects of stare decisis, 374 but also which institution, the Court or
Congress, is better situated to modify qualified immunity, 375 as well as what
more rights-protective amendments short of completely eliminating the defense might look like. 376
It is worth noting, however, that there are good reasons to think that
completely eliminating qualified immunity would not cause the sky to fall.
Setting aside qualified immunity would simply mean that executive officials
would face the same litigation landscape that private defendants face. And
the law does a great deal to protect private defendants from meritless suits—
especially through pleading and summary-judgment standards that are more
difficult for plaintiffs to overcome now than when Harlow was decided. 377
CONCLUSION
Qualified immunity is under attack. Stakeholders ranging from the
NAACP to the Cato Institute have advocated its reconsideration. But the Supreme Court persists in employing and even extending the doctrine. Perhaps, therefore, the governing Harlow standard rests on something more
than the policy and positive-law rationales on which previous criticisms have
focused.
Indeed, the Harlow standard emerged in the Bivens context, and that
provenance points toward an account of the doctrine that sounds in constitutional structure and resonates throughout the relevant jurisprudence. One
aspect involves separation of powers: that Harlow righted the Bivens regime’s
alleged wrongs by cutting back on a cause of action that had expanded judicial power and had contracted an arguably exclusive congressional prerogative. The other aspect involves federalism: that equivalent standards must

374. See Baude, supra note 3, at 80–82; Nielson & Walker, supra note 110, at 1856–63.
375. See Michelman, supra note 29.
376. See Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1797, 1832–36 (2018).
377. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting
that “subsequent clarifications to summary-judgment law” lessen defendants’ needs for the
protection afforded by Harlow). As Hillel Levin explains, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
“fundamentally alter[ed] the Court’s approach to the standards governing pleading.” Hillel Y.
Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143,
143 (2010). In particular, these decisions represented a “shift from a liberal notice pleading
standard to a heightened, but nebulous, plausibility standard.” Id. They also reflected “striking
parallels to the Court’s similar shift in the summary judgment context” through three cases
decided in 1986. Id. at 144. The latter decisions are known as the “Celotex trilogy,” id., and consist of Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). To
continue quoting Levin: both sets of decisions provide tools for “getting rid of cases that seem
(at least to someone) to be meritless.” Levin, supra at 146.
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govern in the Bivens and § 1983 contexts to avoid holding state officials to
stricter constitutional rules than their federal counterparts face.
This structural account is important on a descriptive level. But it cannot
sustain qualified immunity as a normative matter. With respect to the separation-of-powers aspect, a compensating-adjustments framework provides
an apt mode of analysis. For those who support the Bivens regime, there is
unlikely to be a sufficient departure from optimal constitutional design for
qualified immunity to offset. And for those who oppose the Bivens regime,
qualified immunity should represent a problematic response in both scope
and substance. The theory underlying the federalism aspect of the structural
account is unclear, and more work remains on questions concerning federal–state parallelism in constitutional enforcement. But to the extent that
support could come from an equal-sovereignty principle, the incorporation
doctrine, or the congruence-and-proportionality concept, the equivalence
directive as applied in Harlow and its progeny stretches each area beyond
recognition. The directive thus appears to turn on a notion of freestanding
federalism that is too far removed from the actual constitutional design.
At bottom, the structural account advanced here cannot rescue the Harlow standard for qualified immunity from the cloud of suspicion that previous criticisms have created. And the dangers of denying what often
embodies the only possible remedy for constitutional violations are too substantial to rest on a doctrine that lacks legitimacy. There are good reasons to
conclude, therefore, that proponents of the defense, including the Supreme
Court itself, have failed to make their case—and that the legal community
should significantly restrain or simply reject qualified immunity.
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